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Abstract 
 
The theoretical debate over whether countries can and should set tariffs in response to the foreign 
export elasticities they face goes back to Edgeworth (1894). Despite the centrality of the optimal 
tariff argument in trade policy, there exists no evidence about whether countries actually exploit 
their market power in trade by setting higher tariffs on goods that are supplied inelastically. We 
estimate disaggregate foreign export supply elasticities and find evidence that countries that are 
not members of the World Trade Organization systematically set higher tariffs on goods that are 
supplied inelastically. The typical country in our sample sets tariffs 9 percentage points higher in 
goods with high market power relative to those with low market power. This large effect is of a 
magnitude similar to the average tariffs in the data and market power explains more of the tariff 
variation than a commonly used political economy variable. The result is robust to the inclusion 
of other determinants of tariffs and a variety of model specifications. We also find that U.S. trade 
restrictions that are not covered by the WTO are significantly higher in goods where the U.S. has 
more market power.  In short, we find strong evidence that these importers have market power 
and use it in setting non-cooperative trade policy. 
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Introduction 
 The idea that countries set tariffs in response to their market power in international markets is 
the single most controversial result in international trade policy. It is not hard to find examples of first 
class theorists arguing that it provides the underlying motive for the world trading system (Bagwell 
and Staiger, 1999) while others argue that it is little more than an intellectual curiosity with no 
practical value in all but the largest countries (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1997). Given that the theoretical 
debate over optimal tariffs goes back over a century, one might ask, “What evidence is there in favor 
or against the notion that tariffs vary inversely with export supply elasticities?” The answer is none. 
In this paper we provide evidence that non-members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
systematically set higher import tariffs on goods in which they have market power, i.e. goods that are 
supplied inelastically. We also find that U.S. trade restrictions that are not covered by the WTO are 
significantly higher in goods where the U.S. has more market power. The results are robust to the 
inclusion of political economy variables and a variety of model specifications. The results isolate an 
effect that is not only statistically significant but also economically important both relative to other 
explanations and to the average tariff in the typical country. In short, we find strong evidence that 
countries have market power in imports and exploit it in setting their trade policy. 
The theory that a country might gain from protection has a long history.1 The intuition for why 
countries might gain from tariffs through an improvement in their terms-of-trade stems from two key 
insights. The first, from Torrens (1833) and Mill (1844), is that there are many possible prices at which 
countries would be willing to trade. The imposition of a tariff creates a welfare loss due to 
consumption and production distortions, but it can also produce a gain if foreign suppliers reduce their 
prices in order to maintain market access. If the losses due to the domestic distortion are less than the 
gains from the price or terms-of-trade effect, a country can gain from a tariff.  
Edgeworth (1894) provided the key insight regarding when a country should impose a tariff. 
He showed that as long as a foreign country’s offer curve was not perfectly elastic, a country could 
gain from a tariff. In this case, the reduction in import demand caused by a tariff leads to a reduction in 
the price of all units imported and this first order gain offsets the distortion losses from lower imports. 
Bickerdike (1907) extended Edgeworth’s framework and developed the formula relating the welfare 
maximizing tariff and the inverse of the export supply elasticity. Although Bickerdike framed his 
derivation with one import good and a welfare maximizing government, the basic insight that a 
country’s “optimal” tariff is increasing in its market power applies to more general settings and does 
                                                 
1 Irwin (1996) carefully examines the history of thought on protection and the next two paragraphs draw on it . 
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not require governments to maximize welfare, as we discuss in the theory section. Our objective in this 
paper is to quantify how important market power is in determining a country’s tariff structure. We also 
refer to this effect as the terms-of-trade motive for tariffs, as is common in the literature. 
Trade economists have long been uncomfortable with the optimal tariff argument. From a 
normative perspective, the key objection is that if a tariff improves a country’s terms-of-trade, it 
worsens those of its trading partner, who may therefore retaliate leaving both worse off relative to free 
trade.2 As a positive theory of trade protection, the optimal tariff argument is often questioned for two 
reasons.  First, “small countries have very little ability to affect the world prices of either their imports 
or other exports, so that the terms-of-trade argument is of little practical importance” as Krugman and 
Obstfeld (1997, p. 226) write in their undergraduate textbook. But until now there is little evidence on 
this account, and it may be more correct to argue, as Feenstra (2004) does in his textbook, that the 
basic welfare maximizing formula for tariffs “is not very helpful because there is little that we know 
empirically about the elasticity of foreign export supply.” The second objection is that governments do 
not set tariffs to maximize social welfare.  While this last argument is often true, we have already noted 
that it is not a necessary condition for a positive relationship between tariffs and market power. 
Despite the skepticism regarding the practical importance of the optimal tariff argument, it 
continues to feature prominently in the leading theoretical trade policy models. Grossman and 
Helpman (1995) extend their endogenous trade policy model to the case where a country is “large”, i.e. 
it faces finite export supply elasticities. Although not stressed in their paper, there would be no motive 
for trade talks in their model in the absence of a terms-of-trade use of the tariff. This is a key point 
made by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) who provide an economic theory of the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT). In this and in subsequent work, Bagwell and Staiger have strongly argued 
that the use of tariffs to explore the terms-of-trade effect can explain many of the key features of the 
current multilateral trading system. Their work has been quite influential despite the fact that there is 
no direct evidence that countries use, or indeed possess, market power in trade prior to entering into 
reciprocal liberalization in the GATT or its successor, the WTO.3 
There is some evidence that changes in trade policy affect the prices of the goods that countries 
import.4 This evidence generally attributes the effect to imperfect competition in specific industries. 
                                                 
2 This outcome is stressed by Scitovsky (1942) but Johnson (1953-54) shows that certain countries may actually gain from 
using optimal tariffs even with retaliation. 
3 The optimal tariff equilibrium is also used as the threat point and the main theoretical motive for preferential trade 
agreements in many influential papers. 
4 Kreinin (1961) estimates that more than two-thirds of U.S. tariff reductions in the Geneva trade Round were passed on as 
higher prices to countries exporting to the U.S. Chang and Winters (2002) estimate that the elimination of internal tariffs 
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More importantly, these studies do not argue or estimate whether countries changed their trade policies 
to affect their terms-of-trade much less if they did so taking the export supply elasticity into account. In 
fact, little is known empirically about the foreign export supply elasticity since most calculations of 
trade elasticities simply assume that it is infinite. 
The measurement of foreign export supply elasticities, which quantifies an importers’ implied 
market power, constitutes one of the contributions of this paper. We rely on the methodology of 
Feenstra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2006) to estimate these elasticities for each 4-digit 
Harmonized System (HS) category during the period 1994-2003 for the 15 non-WTO members for 
which this and the relevant tariff data is available for a large fraction of products.  
We find that the inverse export supply elasticity faced by an importer is between 1 and 3 for the 
typical 4-digit HS good. We also test several conjectures about these elasticities and find support for 
them in our estimates. For example, larger countries face less elastic export supply curves, which 
indicates that, on average, they have more market power than small ones. This is true if we use GDP or 
a country’s share in world imports in a particular good as a measure of size. Moreover, these 
elasticities are positively correlated across importing countries for any given good. This is likely to be 
the case if importers systematically have more market power for some types of goods. We confirm this 
conjecture by finding that importers face much flatter export supply curves for commodities, where the 
inverse elasticity is 0.5, than for differentiated products, where it is 2.4. The implied pass-through from 
tariffs to export prices are also in line with existing evidence on tariff and exchange rate pass-through. 
Using these elasticities we then estimate that, prior to entering the WTO, countries set higher 
tariffs on products where they have more market power, i.e. higher inverse export supply elasticities. 
This effect is present both when we compare median tariff rates across countries and when we compare 
actual tariff rates across Harmonized Tariff System (HS) 4-digit goods within countries and industries.  
The impact of market power on tariffs is robust to many different specifications. The effect is present 
using continuous and discontinuous versions of the export supply elasticity measure and controlling for  
unobserved industry heterogeneity in each country. The estimate is positive and significant in the 
pooled sample and also positive in all 15 countries and significant for 13. Moreover, we address the 
possibility of omitted variable bias and measurement error via an instrumental variables approach.  
The result is also robust to the inclusion of variables that capture two prominent motives for 
protection: revenue and lobbying. As is common in recent tests of political economy models (e.g., 
Goldberg and Maggi, 1999), we find that the lobbying effect is strong. Nonetheless, the market power 
                                                                                                                                                                     
between Argentina and Brazil caused prices of exports into Brazil to fall. There is also evidence of imperfect pass-through 
from exchange rates and that the effect is symmetric to that of tariff changes for the U.S. auto sector (Feenstra, 1989). 
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effect on tariffs remains positive and significant. It is at least as important as the lobbying motive both 
in terms of the magnitude and the fraction of tariff variation explained.  
The estimated effect is also economically important. In particular, we find that the typical 
country sets tariffs 9 percentage points higher in goods where it has medium or high market power 
relative to those with low market power. These goods represent two-thirds of each country’s sample. 
The effect is important in 13 of the 15 non-WTO countries; in China it is 35 percentage points.  This is 
roughly the same magnitude of China’s average tariff over all goods and the same relationship between 
the effect and the average tariff holds for the typical country. We estimate that removing this motive 
for tariff setting would lead to significant increases in the prices received by foreign exporters, 
particularly those selling in the larger countries in our sample: China, Russia and Taiwan. 
In order to follow the theory closely, we focus on countries that are not members of the WTO 
and thus set their policies in a unilateral, non-cooperative way. However, we also analyze the role of 
market power in shaping a subset of trade policies that are determined non-cooperatively by the U.S., a 
large member of the WTO. The U.S. sets non-tariff barriers and statutory tariffs (i.e. rates it applies to 
some non-WTO members) with few or no restrictions from the GATT/WTO. We find that market 
power is also an important determinant of these trade policies the U.S. sets unilaterally. Interestingly, 
we find no such effect on those U.S. tariffs set according to WTO rules. This finding is broadly 
consistent with Bagwell and Staiger’s theory of the GATT/WTO and it suggests that market power 
would play an important role for all U.S. trade policies if they were set non-cooperatively, e.g. in the 
absence of the WTO. More generally, these results show that the importance of the terms-of-trade 
motive extends beyond non-WTO members and so understanding its impact on trade policy is essential. 
The paper is organized as follows. We first present the basic theory that we test. In section 3, 
we describe the estimation methodology for the elasticities. In section 4, we describe the data and 
assess the validity of the elasticity estimates. We present the estimation results for non-WTO members 
in section 5 and for the U.S. in section 6. We conclude in section 7. 
2. Theory 
The basic theory underlying the optimal tariff argument is well established. Therefore in this 
section, we provide the basic intuition for the result and show how it is robust to the inclusion of 
political economy considerations. We are interested in how a country sets policy in the absence of 
agreements. So we focus on a country that takes as given the policies of the remaining n≥1 countries.  
Suppose each individual has a utility defined over a numeraire good, c0, and a vector of non-
numeraire goods u(c). Here we consider the simpler case where u(c) is separable and in the appendix 
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we consider an alternative that matches our estimation approach. Omitting the country subscript we 
write this individual’s utility as 
(1) 0 ( )
h h
g gg
U c u c= +∑ . 




c p c I+ ≤∑ , where pg is the domestic price for cg. Given the quasilinearity and separability, 
the demand for each good g is simply a function of its own price, i.e. cg = cg(pg). An individual’s 
indirect utility can be written as ( )h h g ggv I pψ= +∑ , where the last term represents consumer 
surplus.5 Social welfare is then the sum of the individual indirect utilities: 
(2) ( )h g gh gW I pψ = + ∑ ∑ . 
To determine income, Ih, we employ the standard assumptions in the leading endogenous trade 
policy models, e.g. Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995). First, the numeraire is freely traded and 
produced using only labor according to a constant returns production. So the equilibrium wage is  
determined by the marginal product in this sector, which we normalize to one. Second, the non-
numeraire goods are produced using a constant returns production with labor and one factor specific to 
the good. So each specific factor earns a quasi-rent that is increasing in the good’s price, πg(pg). Finally, 
tariff revenues for each good, rg(pg), are redistributed uniformly to all individuals. All individuals own 
a unit of labor and a fraction of them also own up to one unit of specific capital. So, if we normalize 
the population to one, the wage income also equals one and we can rewrite social welfare as 
(3) ( ) ( ) ( )1 g g g g g ggW p r p pπ ψ = + + + ∑ . 
The world price for each traded good g ∈ Gm is determined by the market clearing conditions 
(4) ( )( ) ( )* * *1     g g g g g mm p m p g Gτ+ = ∀ ∈  
where mg represents home's import demand written as a function of the domestic price, 
*(1 )g g gp pτ= + , 
and *gm is the rest of the world’s export supply. From this we obtain prices as functions of the trade 
policy: ( )g gp τ , ( )*g gp τ .6 
                                                 
5 More specifically, ( )( ) ( )( )g g g g g g g gg gp u c p p c pψ  ≡ − ∑ ∑ . 
6 In a setting with many importers the equilibrium prices also depend on other importers’ tariffs. This does not affect the 
results here because the optimal tariff prediction takes the other countries’ policies as given and we will focus on the case 
where there is a constant foreign export supply elasticity, which is independent of prices. 
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A government choosing the optimal tariff to maximize (3) will then set the tariff for each good 
g according to the following first order condition:7 
(5) 
*
* 0    g gg g g m
g g
dm dp
p m g G
d d
τ τ τ− = ∀ ∈ . 
The first term represents the domestic distortion caused by the tariff.  The second term 
represents the terms-of-trade effect. If the country has no market power in trade, i.e. if the export 
supply elasticity is infinite, then * / 0g gdp dτ = , and the optimal tariff is zero. Otherwise the optimal 
tariff is positive and can be shown to equal the inverse export supply elasticity,8 
(6) ( )( ) 1* * * *g / /optg g g g gdm dp p mτ ω − = ≡   . 
The positive relationship between protection and the inverse elasticity, ωg , extends to more 
general settings, one of which we examine in the appendix. Here we highlight a few other points. The 
separability assumption in our model implies that the tariffs in (6) do not reflect any monopoly power 
in the export sector. The original Bickerdike formulation allowed for both market power in the import 
and export sectors. He showed in a two good world that if a country could not impose an export tax, 
the optimal tariff was linearly related to the inverse export elasticity (although not with a coefficient of 
unity) plus another term that was related to the inverse demand elasticity of this country’s exports. 
Graaf (1949-50) extended this result to multiple goods and showed that if countries can impose both 
export taxes and import tariffs, and the cross-price elasticities are all zero, then the optimal policy is to 
impose an export tax equal to the inverse demand elasticity and import tariff equal to the inverse 
export elasticity. The bottom line from these more complex policy experiments is that monopoly 
power in the export sectors may create an additional motive for the use of import tariffs (c.f. Alvarez 
and Lucas, 2005; Gros, 1987 shows this is the case even for “small” countries when products are 
differentiated). But this additional motive does not eliminate the first order incentive to impose higher 
tariffs in sectors in which imports are supplied less elastically. It is this last prediction that we test. 
A common objection to the terms-of-trade motive for tariffs as a positive theory of trade policy 
is that governments do not choose tariffs to maximize social welfare. However, a positive relationship 
                                                 
7 Taking dW/dτg=0; using the envelope theorem, ( ) * *( ) ; and 1g g g g gg g g
g g g g
d p dp dp dp
c p
d d d d
ψ ττ τ τ τ= − = + +
, we obtain (5). 
8 By applying the implicit function theorem to (4) we obtain an expression for * /g gdp dτ , which can  be used in (5) to 
obtain the expression in (6) after some algebraic manipulation. 
10 Most trade policy models that provide a political economy motive for a tariff must in fact rule out these other 
instruments; otherwise in those models the tariff's only role would be to affect the terms-of-trade. This is an example of the 
puzzle of the use of inefficient policies for redistribution. Rodrik (1995) points out it is particularly problematic for trade 
policy, Drazen and Limão (2004) provide one explanation for it.  
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such as the one in equation (6) can also describe the equilibrium policy even in models where the 
government has other objectives, such as redistribution of income to particular specific factor owners. 
A key insight in the trade policy literature is that of targeting (e.g. Bhagwati and Ramaswami, 1963), 
which states that if a government has domestic objectives they can be met more efficiently using a 
instruments other than tariffs, and that when these instruments target the distortion at the source, the 
optimal tariff is zero in a small economy. The counterpart to this insight for a large economy is that 
when the government’s objective function places some value on additional income from the improved 
terms-of-trade, we obtain a positive relationship between the tariff rate and the inverse elasticity 
provided that the government also uses instruments such as subsidies or transfers that target the other 
externalities.10 
The positive relationship between tariffs and inverse elasticities can also hold if the 
government’s objective is not social welfare maximization and it does not have other policies to 
redistribute income to producers. Grossman and Helpman (1995) extend their political contributions 
trade model to the large country case. The non-cooperative tariff that the government chooses in that 
model maximizes a weighted sum of social welfare and contributions, Cg, from the L organized lobbies 
representing specific factor owners, i.e. aW+∑g∈LCg. In this case, the optimal tariff is  




ατ ω α σ
−= + +   
where the last term reflects the lobbying motive for tariffs. If a, the government’s marginal rate of 
substitution between contributions and social welfare, is infinite then we obtain the welfare 
maximizing optimal tariff. More importantly, the partial positive relationship between the tariff and 
gω  holds even when this government places no weight on social welfare. We can see this by noting 
that as long as any positive fraction of the population is organized into lobbies, i.e. (0,1]α ∈ , the 
second term in (7) remains finite even if the government does not value social welfare at all, i.e. if a 
equals zero. This occurs because lobbies’ contributions account for all the costs and benefits of the set 
of tariffs they bid on. One such benefit is the terms-of-trade gain that the lobbies reap via the 
redistributed tariff revenue, even if they produce a good other than g. 
The tariff for an organized group is increasing in zg, the inverse import penetration ratio, 
because a given tariff generates larger benefits for a factor owner if it applies to more units sold.11 The 
tariff depends negatively on the import demand elasticity, σg, reflecting the basic Ramsey taxation 
intuition that, once the terms-of-trade effect is accounted for, the tariff's distortion is increasing in this 
                                                 
11 The variable zg is defined as the ratio of domestic production value to import value, where the latter excludes tariffs. 
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elasticity. As Helpman (1997) shows, the size and elasticity effect captured by zg/σg also arises in other 
political economy models and so we will use this variable as one of the controls in the estimation.  
The key obstacle in estimating the impact of market power on tariffs is obtaining elasticity 
estimates for a broad set of countries and goods. In order to achieve this, we must impose some 
structure on the data. We now briefly describe how the standard approach above can be extended in a 
way that is both compatible with our estimation of the elasticities and delivers the positive effect of 
market power on tariffs.  
In the next section, we describe the system of import demand and export supply equations that 
we use to estimate the elasticities. This system can be derived in a setting where any foreign variety 
(i.e. a good imported from a particular exporter) is valued according to a CES utility function, and 
supply is perfectly competitive. In the appendix, we show that the optimal tariff in a model with CES 
utility over foreign varieties of a given good is identical to equation (6), i.e. the inverse export 
elasticity. This occurs when utility is separable across goods (but not varieties); the tariffs do not affect 
the relative demand of varieties within any given good; and hence the only distortion that is addressed 
by the tariff is the terms-of-trade externality. As we prove in the appendix, there are three assumptions 
that imply the tariff in a good does not affect the relative demand of varieties within it; these 
assumptions are mainly driven by the constraints imposed by the data, sample and estimation. First, 
consumption and foreign export supply elasticities within any given good are constant. Second they are 
identical across varieties, i.e. exporters of that good. Third, tariffs of a given country in any given year 
are equal across exporters of the same good.12  
3. Estimating Foreign Export Supply and Import Demand Elasticities  
A key reason why the impact of market power on tariffs has not been examined before is the 
difficulty of obtaining reliable measures of the elasticity of foreign export supply as required by 
equations (6) and (7) for example. In fact, most calculations of trade elasticities simply assume that 
countries face an infinitely elastic supply of exports and therefore estimate only import demand 
elasticities. In this section, we explain how to obtain the elasticities of foreign export supply and 
                                                 
12 In an extreme version of the optimal tariff argument, we may expect countries to discriminate across different exporters 
of the same good. The most common way this occurs is through preferential agreements. However, in the country-year 
sample we consider such agreements are not important.  Nine of the fifteen countries do not report preferential rates and for 
five countries that do report them, those rates apply to only a small share of their tariff lines or imports. One reason why 
these countries generally define tariffs on the basis of a good and not origin is that the administrative cost of optimal 
discrimination may be too high since it would require preventing international arbitrage by strictly enforcing rules of origin.  
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import demand for each good in each importing country. We do so using a methodology derived by 
Feenstra (1994) and extended by Broda and Weinstein (2006).13 
We estimate the import demand and inverse export supply elasticities (σig and igω , 
respectively), using the following system of import and export equations: 
(8) ( )ln 1 lnig ig igk k kigvt ig igvt igvts pσ ε∆ = − − ∆ +  
(9) ln ln
1




ω δω∆ = ∆ ++  
Equation (8) represents the optimal demand of country i for a given variety v of a good g – derived 
from a CES utility function – and (9) represents the residual export supply country i faces in that 
variety. Both are expressed in terms of shares, where igvts is the share of variety v of good g in country i. 
The equation for each variety imported by country i is differenced with respect to time t and a 
benchmark variety of the same good g imported by i, denoted kig. More specifically, the difference 
operator we use for the shares and domestic prices is defined as ig
ig
k
igvt igvt igk tx x x∆ = ∆ −∆  where ∆  
stands for a simple time difference. The last parameter in (8) , ig
ig
k
igvt igvt igk tε ε ε= − , represents demand 




igvt igvt igk tδ δ δ= − , where igvtδ  includes shocks to the residual export supply when expressed 
as a function of importer prices, e.g. exchange rate changes between countries i and v.  
                                                 
13 Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate import demand elasticities for a range of imports but do not report the export 
supply elasticities. Feenstra (1994) reports both elasticities for eight specific products. Both studies focus only on the U.S. 
Iriwin (1988) and Romalis (Forthcoming) report both elasticities. However, because they are at the aggregate level and for 
only two countries (the U.K. and U.S. respectively), they cannot be used to estimate the impact of market power on tariffs. 
15 Generally the foreign export supply is written as a function of the price received by the exporter, *igvtp . In the presence of 
some ad valorem trading cost, igvtτ , and bilateral exchange rate, eivt, the domestic price is ( ) *1igvt igvt ivt igvtp e pτ= +  and so 
( ) ( )*ln ln ln [ ln 1 ln 1 ]ig ig ig igk k kigvt igvt ivt igvt igk tp p e τ τ∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + − ∆ + . Thus the export supply error, igkigvtδ , contains the bilateral 
exchange rate shocks, as noted in the text. Since these can be frequent and large they are a more important source of 
variation than shocks to relative trade costs. For example, if igvtτ  represents transport costs then a change in it is likely to be 
similar across varieties of a good when it is due to say improved importer ports, so the relative shock is zero. If 
igvtτ represents a tariff, then the relative shock in brackets is also zero in several cases. To see this note that we define the 
good at the HS4 level. Although most of these countries’ MFN tariffs are set at the HS6 level only 10% of their tariff 
variation occurs within HS4 so often we have 
igigvt igk t
τ τ≈ . The relative trade cost shock is zero even if the country is 
undertaking a unilateral liberalization (e.g. China), since its tariff changes are similar for all its exporters of a given good, or 
if it implemented a preferential agreement prior to time t (e.g. Saudi Arabia). Some of the countries in the sample 
implemented preferential agreements during the period we use the trade data, which is a relative shock that the differencing 
does not eliminate. However, this is reflected only on the export supply error, igkigvtδ , since the demand equation controls for 
the domestic price, and thus does not invalidate our elasticity identification assumption. Nonetheless, we address the 
possibility that such tariff changes affect the elasticity estimate by using IV in the tariff estimation section. 
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An important feature of the method used is that it requires double log-differencing the data. 
This implies that the level of tariffs on varieties or goods will not affect our estimated elasticities, 
which reduces the possibility of reverse causality when we estimate their effect on tariffs. More 
generally, changes in trade costs at the good level will also typically not affect the estimates. Similarly, 
our estimates will not be biased in the presence of any fixed costs of exporting that cause some set of 
countries to have no exports of a variety over time whereas others have positive exports. Finally, our 
estimates will be unbiased if there are quality differentials across countries for a given variety or if 
there are good specific trends in these differentials.15 
There are two important conditions needed to identify the elasticities. First, igω and σig are 
constant over varieties and this time period (but they can vary over importers and goods). Second, 
demand and supply shocks relative to the benchmark variety are uncorrelated, i.e. ( ) 0ig igk kt igvt igvtE ε δ = .  
In the robustness section and in the appendix, we analyze if our results are sensitive to some of 
these identifying assumptions; for now we simply note why they may be plausible. The elasticity of 
substitution over varieties of a good, σig , is a preference parameter and thus not likely to vary across 
the short time period we examine or across varieties for a finely defined good. The residual export 
supply elasticity, igω , depends, among other things, on production elasticities and on the rest of the 
world’s import demand elasticities, j igσ ≠ . The latter should not change much over the time-span of our 
data, 6-9 years, for the reason noted above. However, we will test whether allowing for different 
elasticities across exporters of a given good changes the results. Finally, the assumption of 
independence of relative errors is likely to be reasonable because the large shocks on a yearly 
frequency are often due to bilateral exchange rate changes. These are captured as supply shocks in (9) 
and, at this frequency, they are unlikely to be correlated with demand shocks such as relative taste or 
quality. Ultimately, this is an empirical question and in the appendix we test and find evidence that 
supports this assumption.  
To take advantage of the independence of errors condition, ( ) 0ig igk kt igvt igvtE ε δ = , we solve (8) and 
(9) in terms of those errors and multiply them together to obtain: 
(10) ( ) ( ) ( )2 21 2ln ln ln lnig ig ig igk k k kigvt i igvt i igvt igvt igvtp s p s uθ θ∆ = ∆ + ∆ ∆ +  
where ( )( )1 1 1igig ig ig
ωθ ω σ= + − , 
( )






ω σθ ω σ







σ= − .  Note that the error term, 
uigvt , is correlated with the regressands that depend on prices and expenditure shares. However, 
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Feenstra (1994) shows that a consistent estimator of ( )1 2,ig igθ θ=igθ  can be obtained by averaging (10) 
over time. To see this we can write the “between” version of (10) as:  
(11) 1 1, 2 2,igv ig igv ig igv igvY X X uθ θ= + +  
where ( ) ( ) ( )2 21, 2,ln , ln ,  ln lnig ig ig igk k k kigvt igvt igvt igvt igvt igvt igvtY p X s X p s= ∆ = ∆ = ∆ ∆  and bars on top of 
these variables denote their time averages (the t subscript is dropped). The independence of errors 
assumption implies ( ) 0v igvE u = . Intuitively, the time-series identification problem of a single 
importer-good pair is solved by using the information available in all the varieties imported of that 
good. While data on prices and shares of a single variety can pin down a relationship between 
 and ig igσ ω , they are insufficient to determine the exact value of these elasticities. Additional varieties 
of the same importer-good pair provide information about how these elasticities are related, and given 
that the true  and ig igσ ω are assumed constant across varieties of the same good, this information helps 
estimate the elasticities.  
Feenstra (1994) also notes that provided there are three varieties of the same importer-good pair 
that are sufficiently different in their second moments then the true underlying elasticities are exactly 
identified.16 We will slightly modify this criterion and follow the procedure in Broda and Weinstein 
(2006). They show that in the presence of measurement error in the prices used to compute unit values 
for each variety, an additional term needs to be added to (10) and a different weighting scheme should 
be used to estimate (11). In particular, unit values are generally better measured when based on large 
volumes. Therefore, the weights and the additional term are inversely related to the quantity imported 
of the variety and the number of periods the variety had positive imports. This implies that at least four 
varieties per good are needed to obtain identification.  
Using this weighting scheme, we first estimate (11) to obtain ˆ igθ and check that it implies 
elasticities in the set of economically feasible estimates, i.e., 1 and 0ig igσ ω> >  for all i and g. If they 
don’t then we perform a grid search over the feasible values of igθ . We evaluate the sum of squared 
errors of (11) at values of 1 and 0ig igσ ω> > at intervals that are approximately 5 percent apart.17 
                                                 
16 The relative variance of demand to supply shocks cannot be identical across varieties. Otherwise they would describe the 
same relationship between the relevant elasticities and no information is added by having a second variety. 
17 For computational easiness, we performed the grid search over values of and ig igσ ρ where igρ  is related to igω  in the 
following way: ( )( )/ 1 1ig ig ig igω ρ σ ρ= − − . The objective function was evaluated at values for [ ]1.05,131.5igσ ∈  at intervals that are 
5 percent apart, and for [ ]0.01,1igρ ∈  at intervals 0.01 apart. Only combinations of and ig igσ ρ that imply 1 and 0ig igσ ω> >  are 
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The precision for the typical elasticity is obtained by bootstrapping. We re-sampled the data for 
each importer-good pair 250 times and computed estimates of the importer-good elasticity each time. 
The procedure used to compute these bootstrapped elasticities replicates the one in the estimation of 
the actual elasticities.18  
4. Data, Descriptive Statistics and Assessment of Elasticity Estimates 
4.1 Data 
In order to estimate the impact of market power we need data on tariffs, domestic production 
and elasticities. In deciding what set of countries to include we face both theoretical and empirical 
constraints. The theory applies to countries setting their trade policy unilaterally in a non-cooperative 
way. Since a major function of the GATT/WTO is to allow countries to reciprocally lower their tariffs 
in order to internalize the terms-of trade effects, we focus the test on non-GATT/WTO members.  In 
section 6 we provide additional evidence for a set of policies set non-cooperatively by a WTO member.  
Our tariff data comes from the TRAINS database, which provides data at the 6-digit HS level. 
Unfortunately, some non-WTO countries report this data for only a small share of goods making it 
impossible to make meaningful comparisons across goods or compute country averages. Therefore we 
focus only on the fifteen non-WTO countries that report tariffs in at least one third of all 6-digit goods. 
The set of countries and the years we use are reported in Table 1.20 
Our sample includes a non-negligible part of the world economy and is representative of the 
world as a whole in some dimensions. It includes countries from most continents. The average per 
capita GDP in the sample is $9,000, which is similar to the world average of $8,900. The 15 countries 
comprise 25% of the world’s population and close to 20% of its GDP (in PPP). This is due to the fact 
that it includes two of the world’s ten largest economies, China and Russia, as well as several smaller 
but non-negligible countries such as Taiwan, Ukraine, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Czech Republic. 
The trade data is obtained from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
(COMTRADE). This database provides quantity and value data at 6-digit 1992 HS classification for 
bilateral flows between all countries in the world. As we can see from Table 1, the import data for 
                                                                                                                                                                     
used. To ensure we used a sufficiently tight grid, we cross-checked these grid-searched parameters with estimates obtained 
by non-linear least squares as well as those obtained through Feenstra’s original methodology. Using our grid spacing, the 
difference between the parameters estimated using Feenstra’s methodology and ours differed only by a few percent for 
those σig  and ωig  for which we could apply Feenstra’s “between” approach. 
18 The only difference is that a broader grid is used in case the regression coefficients imply elasticities of the wrong sign. 
This is solely for computational easiness, since this bootstrap procedure has to compute over 3 million elasticities.  
20 This criteria was binding for only four countries: Bahamas, Brunei, Seychelles and Sudan. 
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most countries in our sample covers the period 1994-2003. For Taiwan we use UNCTAD’s TRAINS 
database since COMTRADE does not report data for this country.   
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The choice of what constitutes a good is dictated by data availability. The more disaggregated 
the choice of good the fewer varieties per good we have, and thus at some point the elasticity estimates 
become too imprecise. Therefore in estimating (8) and (9) we define a good, g, as a 4-digit HS 
category and a variety, v, as a 6-digit good from a particular exporter. Table 2 shows that the typical 
country has 1100 4-digit categories with positive imports between 1994 and 2003. The typical good in 
the sample is imported from 17 different countries. There are between 15,000 and 66,000 varieties 
being imported per year by each of these countries. For instance, there were 40 different varieties of 
live fish (4-digit HS 0301) imported by China in 2001, among them were “trout” (HS 030191) from 
Australia and “eels” (HS 030192) from Thailand. The high degree of specialization of exports suggests 
that one should be cautious about assuming that the share of a country in world GDP is a sufficient 
proxy for the ability of a country to gain from a tariff. If China places a tariff on live fish, it is not clear 
that Thailand can easily export its eels elsewhere and receive the same price.  
Table 2 also shows statistics describing the tariff data at the HS4 level. There are several 
important features to note. First, variation across countries accounts for one-third of the total variation. 
The mean across countries ranges from 4 to 38 percent, with 10 being the typical value, the range and 
typical values for medians are similar to the mean. Second, there is also considerable variation within 
countries, the standard deviation ranges from 1 to 26 percent and 9 is the typical value. Finally, since 
we estimate the elasticities at the HS 4 level we aggregate the tariff data up to that level by taking 
simple averages. As we can see from the last column the precise aggregation method and focus on HS 
4 variation has little impact since over 90% of the variation in tariffs for the typical country occurs 
across HS 4 rather than within it. 
If one were to take size, as measured by GDP, as a good proxy for market power then the data 
on tariff levels suggests that the skepticism regarding the optimal tariff argument is not entirely 
unwarranted. First, as we can see in Table 2, although China is both the largest country in our sample 
and has the highest tariff, Taiwan, the second largest country has a below average tariff. The 
correlation between median tariff and the log of GDP is 0.48 and that between average tariffs and GDP 
is 0.53 However, if we drop China, those correlations fall to 0.05 and 0.10, respectively.  
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Data on the within-country variation also suggests that the tariff setting policies are likely to be 
more complex than a simple application of the optimal tariff calculus. Figure 1 portrays the within-
country frequency distribution of tariffs at the 4-digit level. Although most countries have large 
dispersion across goods, there are three with either little dispersion, such as Bolivia, or some dispersion 
but with most tariffs grouped into certain value bins, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Moreover we observe 
truncation and some bunching at the lower end of distribution, where about 9% of all tariffs are zero. 
There are a couple of important implications of the stylized facts mentioned above. First, 
although considering cross-country results may yield interesting insights, it may be more reasonable to 
focus on the effect of market power in determining tariffs across goods within countries. Second, in 
some countries the data seems to militate against a simple relationship in which policymakers equate 
the tariff level with a continuous variable such as export elasticities or degrees of political power. One 
can imagine many reasons for this. Perhaps policy makers are uncertain of inverse elasticities or 
political connectedness and therefore divide their tariff schedule in various categories rather 
continuous levels; maybe policymakers employ other means of protection at their disposal when they 
want to achieve high levels of protection; maybe countries are averse to setting tariffs too high out of 
fear of retaliation; or maybe once tariffs hit prohibitive levels, there is no reason to raise them further. 
All of these complications suggest that the effect of market power on tariffs may not follow the 
exact functional forms postulated by simple and stylized models. Thus our focus will not be to test if 
the data confirms or rejects the optimal tariff theory expressed in a particular functional form, but 
rather to estimate the impact of market power on tariffs.  
4.3 Assessment of Elasticity Estimates 
Our estimation strategy requires two phases. First we obtain estimates of import demand and 
export supply elasticities, and second we use these to explain observed tariff levels.  
Since we conduct this analysis at the 4-digit level for each country, we estimate over 12,000 
foreign export supply elasticities – far too many to present individually. Therefore in Table 3A we 
report their summary statistics. In theory, the inverse foreign export elasticity, ωig, can be anywhere 
between zero and infinity. So the median is the best way to characterize the estimates, as it is less 
sensitive to extreme values. The median inverse elasticity across all goods in any given country ranges 
from 0.9 to 3. It is 1.6 in the full sample, implying a median elasticity of supply of 0.6, that is a 1 
percent increase in prices elicits a 0.6 percent increase in the volume of exports for the typical good.  
As will become clear it is also useful to consider how different the typical estimates are across 
terciles. The table shows that the typical estimate for low market power goods (i.e. those with inverse 
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elasticities in the bottom 33rd percentile of a given country) is 0.3, about five times smaller relative to 
medium market power goods (1.6) and 180 times smaller than high market power goods (54). 
Obviously, some of the 12,000 elasticities are imprecisely estimated. Tables 3A and 3B 
indicate that this appears to be an issue for the largest estimates, as indicated by how much higher the 
mean is relative to the median and by the wider bootstrap confidence intervals for elasticities in the top 
decile. In fact when we trim the top decile of the sample, the means fall by almost an order of 
magnitude, down to 13. The same is true for the standard deviation. However, the key point to keep in 
mind is that even in the trimmed sample there is considerable variation in market power across goods 
within a country that is not driven by measurement error and can be used to estimate the effect of 
market power on tariffs. 
Since the standard errors are non-spherical we assess the precision of the estimates via 
bootstrapping. More specifically, we resample the data and compute new estimates for each of the 
elasticities 250 times.23 Since there is no simple way to describe the dispersion of all estimates we 
focus on the key question for our purpose. Namely, whether the estimates are precise enough to  
distinguish between categories of goods in which a country has low versus medium or high market 
power. If the answer to this question is positive then we can address measurement error by using this 
categorical variable as either our market power measure or as an instrument for the continuous variable. 
Before describing the results for the full sample consider the following specific case for Russia 
where we divide goods into a low, medium or high market power category defined by the terciles of the 
inverse elasticity in each country. If we rank goods by market power, we find that the median estimate for a 
low market power good in Russia is 0.5 with an associated confidence interval of [0.2,0.7]. The 
corresponding values are 1.8 and [0.8,3] for the median medium market power good and 33 and [3,53] for 
the median high market power good. Thus, our estimates are sufficiently precise to statistically distinguish 
the median good in the low, medium and high market power groups.   
Obviously, the confidence intervals for a particular good may not be representative of those for all 
goods in a category. Therefore in Table 3B we report the typical confidence interval, lower bound and 
upper bound in each category to describe the range of bootstrap estimates.24 We will be conservative and 
try to distinguish only between low vs. medium or high market power goods. The data clearly allow us to 
distinguish between these goods. For example, China’s typical upper bound for low market power goods is 
                                                 
23 This implies calculating more than 3 million bootstrapped parameters. The results were similar when we moved from 50 
to 250 bootstraps, which indicates that further increases in the number of repetitions should not change the results. 
24 More specifically, the lower bound of the confidence interval reported is the median lower bound over all the individual 
confidence intervals estimated in the relevant part of the sample. Similarly for the upper bound.  
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0.8 whereas its typical lower bound for medium or high market power goods is 1.5. This lack of overlap is 
typical for the sample as a whole where the corresponding values are 0.6 and 1.1. Thus, as we move 
towards our econometric analysis of tariffs and inverse elasticities, we will be able to use a categorical 
classification of goods, into low versus medium or high market power, as an instrument to explicitly 
address measurement error.27 
We now turn to the question of whether our estimates themselves are plausible. There are 
several ways that we can explore this. First, we can look at the magnitudes of the estimates. One 
interesting finding is that even small countries have market power. This may seem surprising if one 
assumes the world is composed of homogeneous goods that are traded at no cost. However, this may 
not be the right framework for thinking about trade for two reasons. First, as we will see, although 
countries have almost no market power in several homogenous goods, these goods make up only about 
10% of the tariff lines in the sample. About 60% of the HS4 goods in the sample are differentiated 
according to the classification in Rauch (1999) with the remaining 30% classified as reference priced. 
This may arise because more differentiated goods are, almost by definition, easier to identify and tax 
differently at the border, hence there are more tariff lines for these goods. Moreover, as we will argue 
below there is also a good reason to expect that countries have higher market power in differentiated 
goods and therefore adjust their tariff schedules accordingly. 
The second reason why “small” countries can have market power is that trade costs can 
strongly segment markets. Empirically, we know that these costs have enormous impact on trade 
patterns and trade volume falls off quite rapidly with distance.28 These costs also imply that some 
goods are only traded regionally so that even countries that are small from the world’s perspective may 
have considerable amounts of regional market power. For example, Ecuador may represent a large 
share of demand for certain regionally traded goods, such as Chilean cement, and it is this elasticity 
that we estimate. This also suggests that countries in regions that are more distant from most of the 
                                                 
27 The bootstrap estimates may also reflect potential heterogeneity of elasticities across exporters since they are obtained by 
resampling with replacement. To the extent that they do the resulting measurement error from the heterogeneity is similarly 
addressed by the instrumenting approach. 
28 According to Anderson and van Wincoop’s review of the literature, “the tax equivalent of ‘representative’ trade costs for 
industrialized countries is 170 percent” (2004, p. 692). Estimates from gravity equations imply that trade with a partner 
who shares a border is typically over 14 times larger than with an identically sized non-bordering country if one considers 
the decay due to distance alone (c.f. Limão and Venables, 1999). 
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world’s demand have a larger range of products that they only trade among each other. So below we 
test the hypothesis that importers in more remote regions have more market power. 
 In practice, the precise value of our elasticities is not critical in determining whether market 
power affects tariff setting since what we rely on is the variation of market power across countries and 
goods rather than its level. To explore how reasonable the variation in elasticities is in these 
dimensions we proceed in four ways. First, we check whether elasticities for the same good estimated 
using data from different countries are correlated. Second, we investigate a particular type of product 
characteristic, its differentiation, to assess whether the estimates fit our priors. Third, we ask whether 
countries have more market power when they are larger, as often stressed by the trade literature, or in 
more remote regions. Finally, we estimate the implied pass-through rates of tariffs to domestic prices 
and compare them to others in the literature. 
The motivation for the first three tests is clearer if we note that the residual supply of exports 
faced by importer i, *igvm , is by definition the difference between the production of good g in country v 
and any consumption in countries j≠i. The export supply elasticity faced by i, 1/ igvω is generally an 
increasing function of both the exporter’s production elasticity, denoted by *gvλ , a weighted average of 
demand elasticities, *j igvσ ≠ ; and a decreasing function of i’s import share, * */igv gvm m . We discuss the 
tests in terms of the inverse elasticity, igvω , so we summarize the relationships above as  
(12)    * * * *( , , / )igv gv j igv igv gvm mω ω λ σ ≠
− − +
=   
Let us first examine whether we obtain similar export elasticities for a given good with 
different datasets. While it is clear from equation (12) that these elasticities can vary across importers, 
it is also clear that some goods may be more elastically supplied than others for all importers. The 
reason is simple: the export supply curve faced by any two importers of a given variety, i.e. from a 
given exporter, shares at least one common term, the value of the exporter’s production. Thus ωigv and 
ωjgv both reflect the same production elasticity, *gvλ . Moreover, to the extent that countries other than i 
and j also consume the good then ωigv and ωjgv also both reflect those consumption elasticities. If our 
estimates are reasonable then this relationship should also be reflected in the “average” elasticities over 
exporters of a given good, ωig and ωjg. Thus, for each country i we regress ln(ωig) for all its goods 
against the mean of ln(ωj≠ig) computed using the data of the remaining 14 countries. We report these 
results in Table 4. The point estimates are all positive and significant, which indicates a very strong 
positive statistical relationship, with a t-statistic of more than 9 for the typical country. Since the 
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datasets are completely different and each elasticity was estimated independently, these results show 
that our measure of market power contains information about systematic variation across goods.29 
We now ask what product characteristics drive the result above and whether they fit our priors. 
Our second test addresses this question by focusing on product differentiation. As we note in equation 
(12) we expect countries to have lower market power in goods with higher elasticity of substitution in 
consumption, e.g. commodities. The reason is simple, if China decreases its demand for a commodity, 
e.g. U.S. soybeans, and as a consequence their price falls, then other countries will substitute towards 
that good and away from other sources of supply (e.g. demand less of Brazilian soybeans and other 
types of beans) so the equilibrium price decline will be minimal. Such substitution is much less likely 
for specialized or differentiated goods such as locomotives, aircraft or integrated circuits because these 
are more likely to be tailored for particular markets. Thus we conjecture that countries have more 
market power in differentiated goods than commodities.  
Rauch (1999) classified goods into three categories – commodities, reference priced goods, and 
differentiated goods – based on whether they were traded on organized exchanges, listed as having a 
reference price, or could not be priced by either of these means. Table 5 uses this classification and 
confirms the prediction by testing the differences of the median and mean market power across these 
categories. The ranking is exactly as expected with the highest market power in differentiated goods 
followed by reference priced and then commodities. The most striking feature of the table is that both 
the median and the mean market power are significantly higher for differentiated products– its median 
value is 2.4, which is about 3 times larger than reference goods and 5 times the value for commodities. 
This pattern is also clear when we look at the median in each category for individual countries, as 
shown in Figure 2. 
We find a similar pattern if we look at specific goods. For example, among the set of goods 
with the largest import shares in this sample, the three goods with the least market power are soybeans, 
barley and natural gas, all with inverse elasticities below 0.1. All of these are commodities for which it 
is reasonable to expect that a single importer would have a small impact on world prices. In contrast, 
the median market power in goods such as printed books, locomotives and integrated circuits are more 
than double the sample median. These are all differentiated goods for which it is more likely that even 
a single importer can have market power. Thus our methodology generates a reasonable ordering for  
major import categories. 
                                                 
29 We use a log specification to minimize the influence of the outliers. The other motive for using the log specification is 
that the estimation procedure for the elasticities cannot yield non-positive estimates. Thus the distribution of estimates is 
skewed with positive deviations from the median vastly exceeding negative ones in magnitude. However, the density 
function of the log of the inverse export elasticity estimates has a pattern quite similar to a normal density plot. 
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As a third check for the “reasonableness” of the elasticities, we examine whether they reflect 
the common intuition that market power increases with country size. Since the sub-sample of products 
for which we can compute elasticities differs somewhat across countries, computing simple means and 
medians across different sets of goods may be misleading. Thus, we include HS 4-digit dummies in the 
regression so as to compare market power for different countries within each import good. The first 
column in Table 6 reports the results from the regression of log inverse export elasticities on log GDP. 
There is a positive relationship, which supports the notion that market power rises as GDP rises.30 This 
is true even after controlling for the clustering of the standard errors. Although GDP is often strongly 
positively correlated with import shares the latter are more appropriate for the current purpose, as 
noted in equation (12).  We also obtain a positive relationship when we use an importer’s market share 
in each good instead of GDP. Moreover, this remains true even if we drop China. Hence our estimated 
elasticities also pass our third “reasonableness” check – larger countries have more market power. 31  
When trade costs are sufficiently large, some goods are only traded regionally. This suggests 
that for any given GDP, a country in a more remote region would be expected to have higher market 
power as it accounts for a larger fraction of the region’s demand, i.e. it has a larger value for * */igv gvm m  
in (12). We confirm this in the second column of Table 6 by including a standard measure of 
remoteness – the inverse of the distance weighted GDPs of other countries in the world. 
A final assessment of our elasticities is to consider their implied pass-through rates, i.e. the 
fraction of the tariff factor increase that is passed-through into higher domestic prices. We compute 
these rates and compare their magnitude and variation over goods to those in the literature. 
Unfortunately, few studies estimate the tariff pass-through. However, there is an extensive literature on 
the exchange rate pass-through. We can draw on the latter because the two pass-through rates should 
be identical in a number of cases, a hypothesis confirmed for example by Feenstra (1989). 
We calculate the pass-through, ζig, as the effect on the domestic price in country i of a given 
good g of a one percent increase in i’s tariff factor, i.e. one plus the tariff  rate, on all exporters of g. 
                                                 
30 This is consistent with the results in Markusen and Wigle (1989) who use a CGE model to calculate the welfare effects of 
scaling up all baseline tariffs and find a larger optimal tariff for United States than for Canada.  
31 When we include both the GDP and import share measure we obtain positive coefficients for both but the import share 
variable is not significant. Although this is partly due to their correlation, the small amount of variation explained by the 
import share (shown by the R-square within) implies that one must be careful about using it as a proxy for market power. It 
is possible that regional import shares are a better measure but given the low R-square we doubt that they would be fully 
satisfactory as a proxy either. The within R-square for GDP is also small, which explains why tariffs and GDP in our 
sample do not have a robust positive correlation (e.g. it disappears once we drop China) but tariffs and inverse elasticities 
do, as we show in the next section. 
33 Note that our pass-through measure does not reflect the import substitution across varieties of g, σig, because we are 
considering an increase in the tariffs on all exporters of that good. The elasticity of substitution across goods in the model in 
the appendix is unity. This also highlights a difference between our approach, where imperfect pass-through can occur even 
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Since pgv = (1 + τ g) *gvp , we have ζig = 1 + d ln *gvp / d ln(1 + τ g). In the theory appendix, we show that in 
our framework the last term is simply –ωig/(1 + ωig) and so ζig = 1/(1 + ωig). Thus using the median 
inverse elasticity of 1.6, the typical pass-through rate in our sample is 0.4, which is similar to the 
values in the literature. Kreinin (1961) finds a pass-through of about one third for U.S. tariff reductions. 
Chang and Winters (2002, p. 898) find imperfect tariff pass-through for Brazil’s imports from Korea 
(0.18), Germany (0.74) and U.S. (0.89). The survey by Goldberg and Knetter (1997) reports that the 
typical exchange rate pass-through is 0.6 with large variation across industries (p. 1250).33 
Finally, consider the variation of the pass-through across types of goods. Using the median 
estimates in Table 5 we find that it is highest for commodities (0.7) then reference priced goods (0.6) 
and lowest for differentiated products (0.3). For specific commodities such as barley, soybeans and 
crude oil we find nearly full pass-through. Thus these estimates are consistent with our priors and with 
studies of exchange pass-through that find higher rates for commodities than other goods.34 
In sum, the analysis above suggests that our elasticity estimates are “reasonable” by a number 
of criteria. We now ask if they are an important determinant in setting tariffs.   
5. Estimating the Impact of Market Power on Tariffs  
5.1 Preview 
We can now answer whether there is any relationship between the tariffs and export supply 
elasticities. Before turning to the regression evidence, we will examine a data plot: the median tariff in 
each country against the median inverse export elasticity. There are many reasons to be skeptical that 
we can obtain a relationship in the country cross section. We only have fifteen countries to work with 
so one may worry that any one country can dominate the results. In addition, the countries in our 
sample have very different political systems, economic conditions, and mix of other protectionist tools 
– all of which are reasons to abandon all hope that a relationship will be visible. However, since the 
cross-sectional story of market power and tariffs has such prominence, it is worthwhile examining it. 
Figure 3 shows that there is a strong positive relationship between the median tariff in a country 
and market power in the typical good, as measured by its median inverse elasticity. The pattern does 
not seem to be driven by any one country or even set of countries on a particular continent or with a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
if the exporter has no market power, and the one in most pass-through studies. The latter typically posits an imperfectly 
competitive exporter (facing an elasticity of demand greater than unity) and then estimates a reduced form price equation 
obtained from its optimal decision to adjust markups (or costs) in response to changes in the exchange rate or tariff factor. 
34 Campa and Goldberg (2005) for example estimate that the average in OECD countries for raw materials is 0.6 whereas it 
is 0.4 for manufacturing (p. 690). 
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particular income level. The positive relationship between median tariffs and median elasticities is also 
statistically significant.35 Of course, there are many reasons to be wary of this relationship, as we just 
pointed out. Fortunately, the vast quantity of country-good data underlying this plot can be used to 
examine the relationship more carefully and in our working paper we confirm its robustness.36  
The result we have presented thus far is suggestive but still far from convincing. Expressing the 
optimal tariff purely in terms of a country’s characteristic such as size and resulting market power may 
be natural in a two-good model, but is not very useful from an empirical perspective because of the 
many cross-country differences that may affect average tariff levels. Furthermore, as we have seen, the 
theory also provides important predictions for tariff variation within a country. Since there is 
considerable variation in tariffs and elasticities within countries and fewer potential omitted variables 
our main results in the next section follow this route.  
5.2 Baseline Results 
Our approach to estimating the impact of market power on tariffs is two-pronged. In this 
section we provide baseline results from specifications where the inverse export supply elasticity is the 
key determinant of protection, and we include country and industry effects to control for tariff motives 
highlighted by various political economy models. In the next section, we further augment the model to 
include two specific prominent motives for protection: tariff revenue and lobbying. The baseline 
estimates are robust to either of these, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Given this and the fact that 
we do not have the required data for all countries for the augmented model we first present the baseline 
results. 
The general econometric model we employ can be written as follows 
(13) ( )ig i ig iG ig igf uτ β ω= + + +η x γ   
where the ad valorem tariff, τ, varies by country i and HS 4-digit good, g, as does the market power 
variable, ω, and G defines the industry of good g. Although the basic theory yields a linear relationship, 
we have discussed theoretical reasons to expect the true effect to diminish at higher levels of market 
power. Because of this and of econometric reasons, we also consider alternative functional forms for 
f(.). Since our main objective is to establish whether market power is a significant determinant of 
                                                 
35 If we regress the median tariff on the median inverse elasticity we obtain a positive slope (b=5.9; s.e. = 2.9; R2 = 0. 21). 
The positive relationship is still present if we exclude China, (b=4.2; s.e. = 2.36). 
36 In our working paper we report the results of regressing average tariffs on the inverse export elasticity controlling for HS-
4 digit fixed effects. This uses the variation within a product and across countries and confirms that the result in Figure 3 is 
robust to issues of measurement error, endogeneity and censoring. 
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tariffs rather than to establish in which countries the marginal effect is stronger, the baseline results 
focus on the case where βi = β for all countries. However, we also present country specific regressions. 
As we discuss in the theory section, the tariff may depend on various other factors. Some are 
country specific, e.g. country location, level of development, expected WTO accession, formerly 
communist, etc. Several others depend on political economy factors that are not easily observable. 
However, many of the latter factors are channeled by lobbies organized at the sector or industry level, 
where each industry, G, includes a different subset of goods, g. A flexible way to capture the impact of 
such determinants on tariffs is to include country and/or industry effects. Therefore we consider three 
alternatives. First, estimating only the country effects and treating any industry-country factors, viG, as 
part of the error term, so that in (13) we have iG i iGv= +η η . Second, including country and common 
industry effects, i.e. iG G i iGv= + +η η η  for all i. This controls for the fact that there is considerable 
variation in trade protection across industries. However, any given industry can have very different 
levels of protection across countries and therefore, the most general case is one where iGη  represents a  
set of industry-by-country effects. The latter is the case we mostly focus on since it controls for a 
considerable amount of unobserved industry heterogeneity and allows us to identify the effect of 
market power on tariffs by exploring product variation within countries and industries. 
Most theoretical trade policy models focus on industry level determinants, which we will be 
able to control for as just described. However, in any given country there may exist certain product 
characteristics that are correlated with market power and affect the tariff set in that product. There is 
little empirical guidance on what these other relevant characteristics are (since most studies are 
conducted at the industry level) and it is therefore impossible to ensure that all relevant ones are 
controlled for. Thus our main strategy for addressing omitted product variables in this section is to use 
instrumental variables. In the next section we test if the IV results are robust to controlling for some 
key determinants of tariffs represented by the vector xig in (13). 
Table 7 presents OLS and Tobit estimates for the pooled sample. The first three columns 
include country effects. The next six columns also include industry effects, which are defined 
according to the 21 sections of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule, e.g. textiles, chemicals, plastics, etc. 
Since the results in columns 1-3 are qualitatively similar to the comparable ones in columns 4-6, we 
discuss the latter.37 The linear market power measure, in column 4, has a positive and significant effect 
on tariffs. The coefficient is small because of a few large outliers in the inverse elasticity, as we 
previously discussed. Moreover, the effect represents an average of increases in the market power at 
                                                 
37 The comparable three specifications with industry by country effects are also similar and available on request. 
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low and high levels. When market power is high, the tariff is closer to being prohibitive and the 
marginal effect of further increases in market power are expected to be small. This is confirmed in 
column 8 by a regression where the knot for the different slopes is endogenously determined by the 
data. Despite the lower marginal effect at high market power those goods do have significantly higher 
average tariffs.38 
A parsimonious way to address the skewness of market power and its non-linear impact on 
tariffs is a semi-log specification, i.e. to use f (ω) = ln(ω) in (13). The OLS estimate in column 6 shows 
that market power also has a positive and significant effect on tariffs under this specification. The 
result is identical for the Tobit specification in column 7 where the tariff censoring point is zero. 
In column 5 we address the measurement error and, to some extent, the functional form issue, 
by sorting each country’s data by the inverse export elasticity and creating a dummy equal to 1 if it is 
above the 33rd percentile. The estimate shows that goods with higher inverse elasticities have higher 
tariffs. In column 9 we find that this difference in tariffs relative to goods with low market power is 
similar for goods where market power is high (above 66th percentile of inverse export elasticity) or 
medium (between 33rd and 66th). This confirms the diminishing marginal effect we found and further 
supports the use of a flexible functional form such as the semi-log or dummy.  
The OLS estimates are potentially biased because of attenuation caused by measurement error 
and omitted variables. Since our objective is to determine causality and provide a quantification of the 
effect of market power on tariffs we must address these sources of bias. In this section we do so by 
using instrumental variables.  
The main instrument we employ for a given country’s market power in a good is the average 
market power in that good in the other countries. The basic motivation is simple: to minimize the 
country-product specific portion of market power that may be correlated with other determinants for 
the tariff on that good in a particular country. In the semi-log specification we could use as an 
instrument the average of other countries’ log inverse elasticities since the variables are strongly 
correlated, as shown in Table 4. This procedure addresses endogeneity concerns. However, when we 
employ the continuous measures, this procedure alone does not necessarily eliminate the measurement 
error since if there are at least a couple of countries with large measurement error in any given good, 
the instrument itself will have considerable error. When assessing the elasticities we showed that our 
estimates clearly distinguish between goods where a country has low vs. medium or high market power. 
                                                 
38 It estimates a slope of 1.9 when market power is below the estimated threshold (53rd percentile), which is considerably 
larger than the slope above it. The threshold in a similar specification without industry effects is at the 33rdpercentile.  
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Thus in equation (13) we instrument f(ωig) with the average of the categorical variable for all countries 
other than i. This instrument is also strongly positively correlated with f(ωig). 
Table 8 presents the IV results for the pooled sample of 15 countries. The results for the full 
sample in Panel A contain three specifications: level, dummy and semi-log. We estimate each 
including country effects (columns 1-3), country and industry effects (4-6) and industry-by-country 
effects (7-9). The latter specification best isolates the impact of market power, but comparing it to the 
other specifications also provides useful insights.  
The first point that stands out is that the estimated market power effect on tariffs is positive for 
all specifications and considerably larger than with OLS. In the semi-log specification for example the 
coefficient is 1.7 when we control for industry or industry-by-country effects in columns (6) and (9) 
respectively. This estimate is ten times larger than the OLS one and significant at the 1% level.39 The 
dummy estimates in columns 5 and 8 illustrate a similar point. Products in which countries have 
medium or high market power have tariffs about 9 percentage points higher, a result that is both 
economically and statistically significant. Since the dummy is less prone to measurement error, these 
results suggest there was a downward bias due to omitted variables that is addressed by the IV. We 
will thoroughly discuss the magnitude of these effects in section 5.6. 
A third point worth noting is the importance of accounting for unobserved industry 
heterogeneity when we employ a parsimonious specification. The estimated market power coefficients 
in columns 1-3 generally double after we account for such heterogeneity in columns 4-6 and 7-9. 
The linear version is unlikely to be the correct functional form, as both the data and basic 
extensions of the theory strongly suggest. However, given its prominence in the basic theoretical 
prediction we also present baseline results for it. The more general specification in column 7 confirms 
the results obtained with the semi-log and dummy: a positive and significant effect that is considerably 
larger than the OLS estimate. 
Recall from the data preview section that Bolivia, Oman and Saudi Arabia had little variation in 
their tariffs with most grouped in two or three value bins. A linear regression approach is generally not 
the most appropriate way to treat these observations – an issue we address below when we estimate the 
regressions for each country. Therefore one may argue that a more accurate estimate for the pooled 
sample should exclude these countries. These results are presented in panel B of Table 8. The key 
difference relative to the full sample is an increase in precision (in terms of the z-statistics). There is 
                                                 
39 There is also indirect evidence that our IV approach addresses the measurement error in ω satisfactorily. Recall that this 
was most important for estimates above the 90th percentile in each country. However, when we re-estimate the IV without 
those observations we obtain very similar estimates for β. 
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also an increase in the magnitude for the dummy and semi-log specifications. The high partial F-
statistics from the first stage regression, in the last row, show that the instrument performs well. 
5.3 Individual Country Results  
To carefully establish the tariff determinants of any given country requires its own paper. 
However, we want to determine whether the baseline results represent trade policy setting in the 
typical country. We remain as close as possible to the framework we have used so far. However, we 
cannot ignore obvious issues such as the bunching of tariffs in Bolivia, Oman and Saudi Arabia. For 
the other 12 countries we still employ the IV approach with industry effects and estimate the 
unrestricted version of (13) for each country. 
Tariffs in Bolivia, Oman and Saudi Arabia have little variation and almost none within 
industries. So it is doubtful that we can find a strong relationship for them and it is clear that we 
require a different econometric approach to address the fact that a large fraction of their tariffs appear 
to be censored below and/or above. Thus for these three countries we run censored regressions where 
we also instrument for the market power variables.40 
Table 9 presents the IV results by country. Panel A focuses on the semi-log specification. The 
first two columns reproduce the pooled results from Table 8 for ease of comparison. The estimate is 
positive for each and every one of the 15 countries. It is also statistically significant at the 5% or 1% 
level for all but two, one of them being Saudi Arabia, where we did not expect a precise estimate 
anyway. The estimate for the typical country is 1.75 and the mean is 2.15. These are very close to the 
pooled estimates, which were 1.73 for the full sample and 2.11 for the sub sample of 12 countries.  
A measure that is more directly comparable across countries is the implied elasticity of tariffs 
with respect to market power. We obtain it by dividing the coefficient by the mean tariff and show it in  
the last row. This value ranges from 0.13 to 0.15 in the pooled estimates. The value is similar to the 
mean over the country estimates, 0.17, as well as the value obtained for the typical country, 0.16, both 
of which are shown in the last two columns. The range of elasticity estimates across countries is fairly 
narrow, from 0.08 to 0.23 for 13 of the countries, and it does not have an obvious pattern. So the 
pooled estimates capture an effect that is typical of the countries in the sample.  
The pattern of heterogeneity in the point estimates across countries in Table 9 provides some 
additional support for the theory. Countries are sorted in decreasing order of their 1996 GDP. The 
largest, China, has the highest coefficient. More generally, the larger economies tend to have larger 
                                                 
40 Most tariffs in Bolivia for example are set at a maximum of 10, so we run an instrumental variable tobit with that value as 
an upper limit. In Oman 10% of the tariffs are set at 0 and nearly all others at 5% so we use two censoring points. For Saudi 
Arabia about 87% of observations have tariffs equal to 12 with most others above it so we use that as the lower limit. 
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estimates. When we test this directly we find that the difference in the estimate is large and 
significant.41 However, as we pointed out in the previous paragraph there is no such pattern in the 
elasticity of tariffs with respect to market power, that is after we divide the estimated coefficient by the 
average tariff. The reason for this is that in this sample average tariffs are higher for larger countries, as 
the theory would predict.  
Panel B presents the analog using the categorical variable. They are qualitatively similar to 
panel A – all positive and also all significant, except for two countries. The typical country sets tariffs 
that are 9 percentage points higher in goods with medium or high market power relative to those where 
it has low power. This effect is almost the same magnitude as the average tariff for the typical country, 
as we can see in the last row. This is a preview of the large effects implied by the terms-of-trade 
motive that we analyze in detail below.  
5.4 Other Robustness Tests  
By construction, much of the variation in our instrument is across goods. This is one key reason 
to focus the analysis within countries and across goods. In the pooled regression the fact that the 
instrument varies mostly across goods could induce a correlation in the error term for any given good 
across countries. Clustering the standard errors by HS-4 addresses this concern and we verified that it 
does not change the significance of the results.  
We can relax the assumption of common elasticities across sets of exporters of a given good to 
country i. However, this is costly since it reduces both the number of elasticities we can estimate and 
their precision. It also raises the question of how we should aggregate the elasticities over exporters of  
the same good to estimate the tariff equation, since the tariff data we use for i does not vary by 
exporter. Nonetheless we test if the results are sensitive to the sample of exporters used. Effectively we 
calculate two estimates for each ωig each using a different set of exporters. For each importer i we rank 
exporters by their total export value in all goods shipped to i in the entire period. The even sample 
includes exporters with even ranking and the odd includes the remaining. We then re-run the baseline 
results in columns 7-9 in Table 8 with each set of estimates. Both sets yield a positive and significant 
effect of market power on tariffs. Moreover the quantitative result is nearly identical across the sets. So 
the precise selection of exporters in estimating the elasticity does not change the key finding.42  
                                                 
41 That is, in the general specification we model βi = β + βL*1(Sizei), where the indicator variable 1(Size) is one if country i 
is above the 66th percentile in terms of size. We defined size as either GDP in 1996 or GDP adjusted by “regional market 
size”, i.e. divided by a distance weighted average of other countries’ GDPs, both yield the same 6 countries. The additional 
instrument required is simply the original instrument interacted with 1(Sizei). The estimates for β remain positive and 
significant and the extra effect for the larger countries was 2.6 for the semilog (s.e. 0.5) and 12 for the dummy (s.e. 2.3). 
42 We omit the table for space considerations but it is available upon request. 
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5.5 Augmented Models: Revenue and Lobbying  
The preceding analysis established that these countries set higher tariffs in goods in which they 
have more market power. However, trade policy can also be strongly influenced by revenue 
considerations and domestic political interests. It is hard to see why there might be a systematic 
correlation between our estimates of export supply elasticities and political economy variables because 
all importer-industry-time variation has been purged from the elasticity data before estimation. 
Moreover, lobbies tend to form at the industry level and, as we reported above, our results are stronger 
when we include industry effects that account for unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, the IV estimates 
indicate that the results are strengthened when we address potential endogeneity problems such as the 
one that could result from omitted variable bias.  
Nonetheless, we want to further test if our baseline results are biased due to omitted variables. 
This would only occur in our IV estimates if certain product characteristics that affect tariffs are also 
correlated with our instrument for market power. As noted before much of the theory and empirical 
evidence on trade protection focuses on industry-level determinants. So there isn’t an obvious list of 
product characteristics we should control for. Thus we focus on two prominent motives for protection 
that also have implications for cross-product variation in protection: revenue and lobbying. This also 
allows us to determine the importance of market power relative to these prominent alternative 
explanations for tariff setting 
Consider first the use of tariffs to collect revenue. To the extent that this motive is correlated 
with the level of development, it is captured by country effects. However, it is simple to show that if 
governments use tariffs to raise revenues they would impose higher tariffs on goods with lower import 
demand elasticity, σig. This occurs because when a given tariff rate is imposed on a good with lower 
import elasticity, it raises more revenue and imposes a lower distortion for the standard Ramsey 
taxation motive. If the import elasticity were correlated with the foreign export supply elasticity, our 
results could simply be picking up the tariff revenue motive.  
The results in Table 10 address this question. We obtain the inverse import demand elasticity, 
1/σig, using the procedure described earlier and instrument it using the same approach as the market 
power variable. That is, we create a categorical variable for each country that is 0 for product g if its 
value of 1/σig is in the bottom tercile in country i and 1 otherwise. We then use its average for that 
product over the other countries as the instrument. 
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 10, we include the tariff revenue variable to augment the baseline 
model with industry-by-country effects. The coefficient on the dummy variable for market power is 9 -
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- identical to the baseline reproduced in the first column. The estimate for the semi-log is also 
statistically identical to the baseline, 1.8 instead of 1.7. So, once we have accounted for industry-by-
country effects and instrumented the market power variable, our baseline estimates do not reflect an 
omitted variable bias arising from a tariff revenue motive for tariffs.43 
The specific political economy factors that are relevant for the tariff structure can also differ 
across these countries. So, we now include a political economy variable that is central in an important 
model, Grossman and Helpman (1995), and that also plays a role in alternative political economy 
models. When all sectors are politically organized, the Grossman-Helpman model provides a 
parsimonious characterization of the effects of both market power and domestic lobbying. In this 
model, tariffs are given by the sum of the inverse elasticity and what we refer to as the lobbying 
variable, zig /σig, as defined in equation (7) with Iig=1.  
Recall that the variable zig is the ratio of domestic production value to import value, where the 
latter excludes tariffs. Thus it requires production data, which we could obtain for 7 of the 15 countries 
in our sample for years close to the tariff data.44 This is only available for all these countries at the 
ISIC 3-digit data from UNIDOs industrial database. So zig can be interpreted as country i’s average 
penetration for the goods in that ISIC 3-digit category. Since we divide this by the import demand 
elasticity, which varies by HS-4, the lobbying variable also varies at the HS 4-digit level.  
In the regressions, we treat the lobbying variable similarly to market power. More specifically, 
we employ either its log or a categorical variable that takes the value of 0 for the lower tercile of zg / σg 
in that country and 1 otherwise. We instrument the variable since production and imports depend on 
tariff levels. The instrument is constructed by taking the average of the categorical lobbying variable 
over the remaining countries for each good. As indicated by the partial F-statistics for the first stage in 
Table 10, the instrument used is strongly correlated with the lobbying variable. 
The last two columns of Table 10 present the estimates when we augment our baseline 
estimates with industry-by-country effects using the lobbying variable above. The market power effect 
in the dummy specification is 10 percentage points – larger but statistically indistinguishable from 
either the baseline for the full sample, 9, or the one in the sub sample of 12 countries, 11. The same 
conclusion holds if we consider the semi-log specification where the estimate is now 1.9.  
Note also that the reason why the results are similar is not because we are adding an irrelevant 
variable. Several studies found that a similar variable is empirically important for other countries and 
                                                 
43 This result is robust to dropping Bolivia, Oman and Saudi Arabia, the only difference being that the tariff revenue 
coefficient becomes positive in the dummy specification but still insignificant.  
44 These countries are Bolivia, China, Ecuador, Latvia, Lithuania, Taiwan and Ukraine. 
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we find that it is significant for this sample as well. Below we quantify the importance of market 
power in tariff setting not just by itself but relative to this important alternative explanation. 
Table 11 shows that these results are not driven by a single country. In all 7 countries for which 
we have production data, market power has a positive effect on tariffs which is statistically and 
economically significant. We now turn to a more detailed quantification of the effects.  
5.5 Quantification 
Table 12 provides summary statistics for the key parameters estimated and computes simple 
counterfactuals that illustrate the economic and statistical importance of market power in tariff setting. 
The columns correspond to the main specifications in the baseline and lobbying augmented models. 
The results are fairly similar across specifications, so we focus on the pooled results with the lobbying 
variable in which we can assess the relative importance of the terms-of-trade motive. 
The first row reproduces the coefficient for the semi-log specification. In the case of the pooled 
regression in Table 10 it indicates that a one log point increase in market power increases tariffs by 1.9 
percentage points. Thus one standard deviation in market power leads to a 5 percentage point increase 
in tariffs, which is large if we recall that the median tariff in this sample is 10 percentage points. The 
market power effect is also important relative to the lobbying variable. Since their coefficients are 
similar so is the elasticity of tariffs with respect to these two important determinants.  
Alternatively, we can ask how important market power is in explaining tariff variation. We will 
do so with respect to a natural benchmark: the importance of political economy. To do this, we 
compute the impact of a standard deviation in each of those variables on tariffs. This effect is about 1.6 
times larger for market power, indicating that it is more important in explaining tariff variation in these 
countries than the lobbying variable. We obtain a similar value if we use the dummy variable, as 
shown in the last row. 
To gauge the economic importance of the terms-of-trade motive relative to all tariff setting 
motives we can compare the average effect due to market power to the average tariff. The effect ranges 
from 8 to 11 percentage points, depending on the specification.  For the typical country this terms-of-
trade motive is about the same magnitude as their average tariff, more specifically it is 92% of the 
average in the baseline and 97% in the lobbying augmented model. Given that the effect applies to 
two-thirds of the tariff lines the implied tariff reductions if these countries did not exert their market 
power would be substantial, much larger than the 25 percent target reduction for developing WTO 
members in the Uruguay Round.  
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One important motive for our study is that if countries possess and exert market power then 
their tariffs depress the price received by foreign exporters. Thus, reducing tariffs increases those 
prices. Our estimates allow us to calculate the price increase for exporters when an importer, i, reduces 
or eliminates its use of tariffs for a terms-of-trade motive. This is an interesting counterfactual because 
this type of beggar-thy-neighbor trade policy is believed to have been central in the trade war of the 
1930’s and arguably one of the key motives behind the creation of the GATT. In fact, Bagwell and 
Staiger (1999) suggest that when a country enters a trade agreement such as the GATT/WTO its tariffs 
no longer reflect the market power component (in a 2-country symmetric model) or reflect it only 
partially. The counterfactual also provides an estimate of the impact of a country leaving the agreement 
and re-exerting its market power, which is obtained by simply by reversing the direction of the 
exporter price effects. 
The price received by exporting variety v of good g to country i can be written as 
( )* * ( ),.igv igv ig igp p τ ω= , i.e. a function of the tariff it faces and other parameters that are omitted. The 
percent increase in that price as an importer starts to treat a given good with medium or high market 
power as if it had low market power is then  
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where ζig is simply the domestic pass-through, which we discussed in our assessment of the elasticities, 
and so ζig -1 is the effect of the tariff factor on exporter prices. In equation (13), iβ  measures how 
much higher tariffs are in a good with medium or high market power relative to low.45  
In the full sample the typical good in the middle tercile in terms of market power has an inverse 
elasticity of 1.6. Therefore, ζig -1 = -0.6 (= 1/(1+ 1.6) -1). Multiplying this by the estimated tariff 
reduction due to treating those goods as low market power goods (which we estimate to be 9 
percentage points in Table 8, column 8) we obtain a 5 percent increase in the price received by the 
exporters. By construction, this applies to 1/3 of goods in each country. For the typical good in the 
high market power bin we have ωig = 54 (Table 3A), and thus any given tariff reduction has a larger 
effect on export prices.  In this case the change in exporter prices for these goods is close to 9 percent.  
                                                 
45 The approximation arises because in equation (13) we use tariffs rather than ln (1 + τig), but these are identical for most 
tariffs in the sample. When they differ, e.g. China, we report the results with the tariff factor. Note also that the estimate for 
ζig -1 assumes that all exporters of good g face similar tariffs. In the WTO interpretation of the counterfactual this implies 
they would all be in the WTO. Otherwise the effect would be larger since the tariff reduction on exporter v alone would 
lead to a additional import demand for v due to substitution away from exporters of other varieties of g not in the WTO. 
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Finally, for the three largest countries, the effect is stronger than the average. Using the country 
specific estimates, the effect for Russia and Taiwan is 6-10% and for China it is particularly large, 17-
25%. Thus, if entry into the WTO leads these countries to remove the portion of their tariffs driven by 
a terms-of-trade motive, exporters into these markets will enjoy a large benefit from this direct price 
effect. By the same token, if these countries were to abandon an agreement and re-exert their market 
power, this would be quite costly for the foreign exporters facing the higher tariffs.  
In sum, the terms-of-trade motive is economically and statistically important for tariff setting in 
these countries. It is more important in explaining tariff variation than a key political economy variable 
used in previous studies. Moreover, it causes significant changes to prices received by foreign 
exporters particularly as they try to sell in the larger countries such as China, Russia and Taiwan.  
6. Market power and trade barriers in a large developed WTO member  
Our focus on non-WTO members is motivated by the theory, which predicts that a country’s 
tariffs will reflect its market power when it acts non-cooperatively. Since the terms-of-trade gain for 
the importer is lower than the corresponding cost to the exporter, cooperation between the two, e.g. as 
they become WTO members, could attenuate or eliminate this motive for tariffs. However, a 
reasonable question is whether the forces we identify in this paper are present for any instruments of 
protection used by WTO members. Obviously, we cannot simply analyze if market power affects the 
MFN tariffs of WTO members because a failure to find such a relationship could simply be due to the 
effectiveness of this agreement in eliminating the terms-of-trade externality (c.f. Bagwell and Staiger, 
1999, and Grossman and Helpman, 1995). Thus we need to consider alternative experiments. 
We consider instruments of protection whose levels are not negotiated within the GATT/WTO 
or are only partially so. While this experiment may not be as clean as our earlier one, it does allow us 
to explore this question further. Moreover, it can provide insights about how the negotiated trade 
policies of current members would change if they were not subject to WTO constraints.  
We focus on two such instruments for the United States both because it has good data and 
because it is the world’s largest economy. First, we follow most empirical studies of U.S. protection 
and use non-tariff barriers (NTB’s) as the measure of its non-cooperative trade policy (e.g. Goldberg 
and Maggi, 1999, Bandyopadhyay and Gawande, 2000). Several of these NTB’s – e.g. antidumping 
duties, countervailing duties, and some forms of quotas – generate higher welfare for the importing 
country if they are implemented in goods where it has market power. Thus the prediction is that NTBs 
are more prevalent in goods with higher market power. Until recently there were no tariff equivalents 
of NTBs for a large set of goods. Thus we use the standard measure of NTB strength in the literature: 
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the coverage ratio, i.e. the share of 6-digit goods within each 4-digit classification that contain an NTB. 
We complement this by using the ad valorem equivalent recently estimated by Kee et al (2006). 
Second, we examine “statutory rates” – the tariffs the U.S. applies to non-GATT countries to 
which it does not grant MFN status. Statutory tariffs are set non-cooperatively, which is apparent from 
their high levels and the targeted countries. 46 Successive rounds of trade negotiations opened a large 
gap between these rates and the MFN rates the U.S. negotiates with and sets on WTO members. The 
average U.S. statutory rate in 1999 was about 30 percent – almost ten times larger than the MFN rate 
in our sample. Although statutory rates currently apply to a small number of countries, understanding 
their determinants provides an interesting and unique insight into how the U.S. sets tariffs non-
cooperatively. Thus they are a useful complement to U.S. NTBs, which apply to many countries.  
Our estimation strategy is similar to the one used thus far. We estimate the relevant elasticities 
for the U.S. using the same procedure and use them to estimate equation (13) including industry 
dummies and instrumenting for the remaining variables. The structure of U.S. production, trade, and 
demand differs in important ways from those of the developing countries we analyzed. Thus we 
thought it would be more appropriate to instrument for U.S. elasticities and import penetration ratios 
using data from large developed countries: Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the U.K. Using this 
data we construct the instruments as before.47 
In Table 13 we report the results for the U.S. The results in Panel A show that the U.S. sets 
significantly higher NTBs in products where it has more market power. This is true if we measure 
NTBs by the commonly used coverage ratio (columns 1,2,5,6) or the ad valorem equivalent (columns 
3,4,7,8). The magnitudes for the ad valorem specification are large since products with NTBs have 
large tariff equivalents; about 18% for the typical HS-4 with an NTB. These NTBs affect a large 
number of products – a quarter of the HS-4 lines in the sample.48 The results are robust to including the 
lobbying variable, which has a smaller impact on tariffs than market power, as we previously found for 
other countries.  
Panel B focuses on tariff barriers. Market power has a strong and significant positive effect on 
statutory tariffs, which the U.S. sets non-cooperatively. These rates are between 21 and 27 percentage 
                                                 
46 In 1989, the countries subject to these tariffs were Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, 
German Democratic Republic, Kampuchea, Laos, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, North Korea, Romania, USSR, and 
Vietnam. Before 1980 China was also subject to this set of tariffs. 
47 The U.S. elasticity estimates are reasonable when we use the criteria previously applied. First, they are strongly 
correlated with those of these five countries. Second, the typical inverse elasticity is highest for differentiated (1.6) than 
reference priced goods (0.55) or commodities (0.41). Third, the pass-through for the typical good is 0.5, which is a common 
value for the U.S. according to Goldberg and Knetter (1997). 
48 We control for the censoring at zero by using an IV-Tobit. For the coverage ratio we also control for the censoring at one. 
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points higher in goods with medium or high market power (columns 1 and 5). Interestingly, the 
elasticity at the mean is 0.17, very similar to the typical value we found for the non-WTO countries.  
Finally, when we use the U.S.MFN rates (columns 3,4,7,8) we find a much weaker relationship 
with market power. In fact, although the effect is positive, it is not significant at the conventional levels. 
Even if we take into account the lower mean of MFN rates we still find a lower elasticity for them than 
for statutory rates. In sum, the evidence on NTBs, statutory tariffs, and MFN tariffs indicates that 
market power matters for U.S. trade policy in areas not covered by the WTO. In other words, when the 
U.S. can set trade barriers non-cooperatively, it takes market power into account. This strongly 
suggests that market power would play an important role for all U.S. trade policy if it were set non-
cooperatively, e.g. in the absence of the WTO. 
7. Conclusion 
The idea that a country can improve its terms-of-trade and welfare through the imposition of 
tariffs has been in the economics literature for over a century. Since then, economists have known that 
the optimal tariff is positive for goods that are supplied inelastically. However, no one has tested 
whether countries set higher tariffs in goods in which they have more market power. This paper is the 
first to provide evidence that importers who are not members of the GATT/WTO do impose higher 
tariffs on goods with lower export supply elasticities. This result is present when looking at tariffs 
across countries, across goods within countries and industries, and even after controlling for tariff 
revenue and various political economy motivations.  
The results go beyond isolating the statistical impact of market power on tariffs. They show 
that the impact is economically significant as well. It is of the same magnitude as the average tariffs in 
these non-WTO members and at least as important as the lobbying motive that has attracted much 
attention in previous work.  Thus, removing the terms-of-trade  motive for tariff setting would lead to 
increases in the prices received by foreign exporters to these markets. These increases are significant 
for the several goods in which we estimate that importers have considerable market power.  
We also find that market power strongly affects the non-cooperative trade policies of a large 
developed country, the U.S. Its statutory tariffs for example are 27 percentage points higher in goods in 
which it has significant market power. Thus the importance of the terms-of-trade motive extends 
beyond non-WTO members and understanding its impact on trade policy is essential. The strong effect 
of market power on non-cooperative policies and its absence on the cooperative tariffs the U.S. 
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Figure 2: Median Inverse Elasticities by Product Type 
(Commodity;Reference Priced and Differentiated Products)





































































1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Median Inverse Export Supply Elasticity
GATT/WTO Tariff Data* Trade Data**
Accession date Source Years
Algeria 93 93-03
Belarus 97 98-03
Bolivia*** 8-Sep-1990 UNIDO 93 93 93-03
China 11-Dec-2001 UNIDO 93 93 93-03
Czech 15-Apr-1993 92 93-03
Ecuador 21-Jan-1996 UNIDO 93 93 94-03
Latvia 10-Feb-1999 UNIDO 96 97 94-03
Lebanon 00 97-02
Lithuania 31-May-2001 UNIDO 97 97 94-03
Oman 9-Nov-2000 92 94-03
Paraguay 6-Jan-1994 91 94-03
Russia 94 96-03
Saudi Arabia 11-Dec-2005 91 93-03
Taiwan 1-Jan-2002 UNIDO 96 96 92-96
Ukraine UNIDO 97 97 96-02
Data Sources and Years
Production Data
Notes: * All tariff data is from TRAINS. Countries are included if we have tariff data for at least one year 
before accession (GATT/WTO). ** Except for Taiwan, all trade data is from COMTRADE. For Taiwan 
data if from TRAINS. *** The date of the tariffs for Bolivia is post-GATT accession but those tariffs were 
set before GATT accession and unchanged between 1990-93.
Table 1
Number of Number Median # of Fraction of HS6 variation 
Varieties* of HS4 goods Var per HS4 No. obs** Mean St. Dev. Median between HS4
Algeria 26466 1100 13 739 23.8 17.4 15.6 0.95
Belarus 24440 1172 12 703 12.4 7.8 10.0 0.94
Bolivia 18592 1064 9 647 9.8 0.8 10.0 0.63
China 63764 1217 33 1125 37.9 26.0 30.3 0.93
Czech 61781 1219 30 1075 9.5 17.6 5.1 0.87
Ecuador 22979 1101 11 753 9.8 5.5 10.6 0.91
Latvia 33790 1128 17 872 7.3 10.5 1.0 0.90
Lebanon 34187 1109 15 782 17.1 14.8 15.0 0.87
Lithuania 34825 1159 17 811 3.6 7.4 0.0 0.90
Oman 20482 1107 10 629 5.7 8.7 5.0 0.76
Paraguay 15430 1049 7 511 16.1 11.3 14.0 0.91
Russian 66731 1187 34 1029 10.7 11.0 5.7 0.95
Saudi Arabia 62525 1202 32 1036 12.1 2.6 12.0 0.93
Taiwan 38397 1215 19 891 9.7 8.5 7.5 0.90
Ukraine 37693 1128 18 730 7.4 7.6 5.0 0.95
Median 34187 1128 17 782 9.8 8.7 10.0 0.91
Notes: * Varieties are defined as 6-digit HS, exporting country pairs. **Number of observations for which elasticities and tariffs are available. 
Table 2
Trade and Tariff Data Summary Statistics 
Tariff Data
Rate per 4-digit HS
Trade Data
Statistic No. obs*
Sample All Low Medium High All W/out top decile All
W/out top 
decile
Algeria 739 0.4 2.8 91 118 23 333 47
Belarus 703 0.3 1.5 61 85 15 257 36
Bolivia 647 0.3 2 91 102 23 283 49
China 1125 0.4 2.1 80 92 17 267 35
Czech Rep. 1075 0.3 1.4 26 63 7 233 18
Ecuador 753 0.3 1.5 56 76 13 243 30
Latvia 872 0.2 1.1 9 52 3 239 8
Lebanon 782 0.1 0.9 31 56 7 215 18
Lithuania 811 0.3 1.2 24 65 6 235 16
Oman 629 0.3 1.2 25 209 7 3536 21
Paraguay 511 0.4 3 153 132 67 315 169
Russia 1029 0.5 1.8 33 48 8 198 18
Saudi Arabia 1036 0.4 1.7 50 71 11 232 25
Taiwan 891 0.1 1.4 131 90 20 241 43
Ukraine 730 0.4 2.1 78 86 16 254 34
Median 782 0.3 1.6 54 85 13 243 30
Table 3A
Notes: *Number of observations for which elasticities and tariffs are available. The tariff availability did not bind except 
for Ukraine where it was not available for about 130 HS-4 goods for which elasticities were computed. ** The median  
over the "Low" sample corresponds to the median over the bottom tercile of inverse elasticities. Medium and High 
correspond to the 2nd and 3rd terciles. 
Inverse Export Supply Elasticity Statistics
Median** Mean St. Deviation
Sample
Statistic Median Median
Algeria 0.5 [0.10 , 0.8] 5.0 [2.0 , 81]
Belarus 0.3 [0.03 , 0.5] 3.0 [0.9 , 58]
Bolivia 0.4 [0.02 , 0.6] 4.2 [1.1 , 87]
China 0.6 [0.15 , 0.8] 5.0 [1.5 , 59]
Czech Rep. 0.3 [0.06 , 0.5] 3.0 [0.9 , 30]
Ecuador 0.4 [0.02 , 0.6] 3.3 [0.9 , 63]
Latvia 0.3 [0.02 , 0.4] 2.3 [0.7 , 6]
Lebanon 0.2 [0.01 , 0.3] 2.1 [0.6 , 29]
Lithuania 0.3 [0.03 , 0.5] 2.3 [0.7 , 28]
Oman 0.4 [0.04 , 0.6] 2.2 [0.6 , 35]
Paraguay 0.5 [0.03 , 0.8] 6.7 [1.9 , 98]
Russia 0.6 [0.12 , 0.7] 3.8 [1.3 , 42]
Saudi Arabia 0.5 [0.10 , 0.7] 4.1 [1.4 , 44]
Taiwan 0.3 [0.01 , 0.3] 3.0 [0.8 , 98]
Ukraine 0.6 [0.08 , 0.9] 4.5 [1.4 , 59]
Median 0.4 [0.04 , 0.6] 3.4 [1.1 , 49]
Bootstrapped Statistics for Inverse Export Supply Elasticities
Low Medium or High
Confidence Interval* Confidence Interval*
"Median" indicates the median of the 250 bootstrapped estimates for each inverse elasticity, ωig . 
The "low" column reports the median of that value in the bottom tercile of the sample for ωig  in a 
country. The value in the medium or high column corresponds to the median in the rest of the 
sample. 
* The lower bound of the confidence interval reported is the median lower bound over all those 
estimated in the relevant part of the sample. Similarly for the upper bound. The individual 
estimates for the 1-2α confidence interval are obtained via the bias-corrected percentile method 
(Efron, 1981) using α=0.1. 
Table 3B
Dependent Variable:
Statistic Beta St. Error R2 Nobs
Algeria 0.80 (0.07) 0.13 739
Belarus 0.80 (0.07) 0.14 703
Bolivia 0.82 (0.09) 0.13 647
China 0.54 (0.06) 0.11 1125
Czech Rep. 0.61 (0.05) 0.12 1075
Ecuador 0.73 (0.08) 0.12 753
Latvia 0.57 (0.07) 0.09 872
Lebanon 0.71 (0.08) 0.11 782
Lithuania 0.70 (0.07) 0.13 811
Oman 0.39 (0.08) 0.04 629
Paraguay 0.94 (0.11) 0.14 511
Russia 0.53 (0.05) 0.11 1029
Saudi Arabia 0.48 (0.06) 0.08 1036
Taiwan 0.31 (0.08) 0.02 891
Ukraine 0.83 (0.07) 0.17 730
Median 0.70 (0.07) 0.12 782
Correlation of Inverse Export Supply Elasticities Across Countries
Table 4
 * Univariate regression of log inverse export supply elasticities in each country on the 
average of the log inverse elasticities in that good for the  remaining 14 countries. 
Log Inverse Export Supply
Differentiated Reference Priced Commodity
Median Inv Elasticity 2.38 0.70 0.45
Standard errors (0.04) (0.06) (0.14)
p-value: differentiated vs. refer. or commod. 0.00 0.00
Mean Inv Elasticity 17.5 9.3 8.3
Standard errors (0.71) (0.70) (1.23)
p-value: differentiated vs. refer. or commod. 0.00 0.00
The number for the mean regression is 7927 because we trim the top decile. The pattern of results with the top decile is
 similar but with higher values. 
Table 5
 Inverse Elasticities by Product Type
Notes:
The number of observations for the median regression is 8734, less than the full sample since not all hs 4 can be 
uniquely matched to Rauch's classification. 
Dependent Variable:




Share of World HS-4 Imports 7.19
(1.48)
Observations 12343 12343 12343
R-square 0.26 0.26 0.25
R-square within 0.01 0.02 0.00
Table 6
Notes: All regressions include 4-digit HS fixed effects (1201 categories). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. In the log GDP regressions, standard errors are clustered by country. GDP is for 1996. 
Remoteness for country i is defined as 1/(ΣjGDPj/distance ij). The share of world imports is calculated in 
2000. 
Inverse Export Supply Elasticities, GDP, Remoteness and Import Shares
Log Inverse Export Supply
Dependent Variable
Fixed Effects
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Tobit OLS* OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Inverse Exp. Elast. 0.0003 0.0004
(0.0001) (0.00004)
Mid and High Inv Exp Elast 1.24 1.46 1.86
(0.25) (0.24) (0.31)
Log(1/Export Elasticity) 0.12 0.17 0.17
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
(Inv. Exp. Elast)*(1-med hi) 1.45
(0.31)
(Inv. Exp. Elast)*med hi 0.0003
(0.0001)
Mid Inv Exp Elast 1.56
(0.28)
High Inv Exp Elast 1.37
(0.28)
Algeria 23.8 23.0 23.6 24.6 23.6 24.3 24.3 23.1 23.6
(0.64) (0.65) (0.64) (0.95) (0.96) (0.95) (0.93) (0.97) (0.96)
Belarus 12.3 11.5 12.2 12.6 11.6 12.5 12.4 11.3 11.7
(0.29) (0.33) (0.29) (0.76) (0.78) (0.76) (0.94) (0.79) (0.78)
Bolivia 9.8 9.0 9.7 10.1 9.2 10.0 10.0 8.8 9.2
(0.03) (0.17) (0.06) (0.73) (0.75) (0.73) (0.95) (0.77) (0.75)
China 37.8 37.0 37.7 38.2 37.2 38.0 37.9 36.6 37.2
(0.77) (0.79) (0.77) (0.98) (1.01) (0.99) (0.89) (1.03) (1.01)
Czech Rep. 9.5 8.7 9.4 9.7 8.7 9.6 8.8 8.3 8.7
(0.53) (0.53) (0.53) (0.85) (0.86) (0.85) (0.89) (0.87) (0.86)
Ecuador 9.8 9.0 9.7 10.3 9.4 10.2 10.1 9.0 9.4
(0.19) (0.26) (0.20) (0.73) (0.74) (0.73) (0.93) (0.76) (0.74)
Latvia 7.3 6.4 7.2 7.3 6.3 7.2 6.9 6.0 6.3
(0.35) (0.40) (0.35) (0.76) (0.78) (0.76) (0.91) (0.79) (0.78)
Lebanon 17.1 16.2 17.0 17.1 16.1 17.0 17.0 15.9 16.1
(0.53) (0.56) (0.53) (0.84) (0.86) (0.84) (0.92) (0.86) (0.86)
Lithuania 3.6 2.8 3.6 3.6 2.6 3.5 -6.0 2.3 2.6
(0.26) (0.31) (0.26) (0.74) (0.76) (0.74) (0.98) (0.77) (0.76)
Oman 5.6 4.9 5.6 5.7 4.8 5.6 4.9 4.4 4.8
(0.34) (0.37) (0.34) (0.77) (0.79) (0.77) (0.94) (0.79) (0.79)
Paraguay 16.0 15.3 15.9 16.3 15.4 16.1 15.9 14.9 15.4
(0.49) (0.52) (0.50) (0.84) (0.85) (0.84) (0.99) (0.86) (0.85)
Russia 10.6 9.8 10.5 10.8 9.9 10.7 10.0 9.4 9.9
(0.34) (0.38) (0.34) (0.77) (0.79) (0.77) (0.89) (0.82) (0.79)
Saudi Arabia 12.1 11.3 12.0 12.4 11.4 12.2 12.1 10.9 11.4
(0.08) (0.18) (0.09) (0.71) (0.74) (0.72) (0.89) (0.76) (0.74)
Taiwan 9.7 8.9 9.6 10.3 9.3 10.1 9.7 9.0 9.3
(0.28) (0.33) (0.28) (0.74) (0.76) (0.75) (0.91) (0.77) (0.76)
Ukraine 7.4 6.6 7.2 8.1 7.1 7.9 6.8 6.6 7.1
(0.28) (0.33) (0.29) (0.74) (0.76) (0.74) (0.93) (0.78) (0.76)
Observations 12333 12333 12333 12333 12333 12333 12333 12333 12333
Number of parameters 16 16 16 36 35 36 35 38 36
Adj. R2 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.66 0.66 0.66 . . 0.66
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis (all heteroskedasticity robust except Tobit). Industry dummies defined by section according to Harmonized Standard 
tariff schedule.  * Optimal threshold regression based on minimum RSS found using a grid search over 50 points of  the distribution of inverse exp. elast 
(from 1st to 99th percentile in intervals of 2). Optimal threshold is 53rd percentile. Accordingly, med hi=1 above the 53rd percentile and 0 otherwise. 
Hansen (2000) shows that the dependence of the parameters on the threshold estimate is not of "first-order" asymptotic importance, so inference on them 
can be done as if the threshold estimate were the true value. 
Table 7
Tariffs and Market Power Across Goods (within countries): OLS & Tobit Estimates
Average Tariff at 4-digit HS (%)
Country Country & Industry
Dependent Variable
Fixed Effects
Estimation method IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Inverse Exp. Elast. 0.040 0.089 0.075
(0.027) (0.055) (0.028)
Mid and High Inv Exp Elast 3.96 8.88 9.07
(0.76) (1.18) (1.08)
Log(1/Export Elasticity) 0.75 1.71 1.73
(0.15) (0.23) (0.21)
Observations 12258 12258 12258 12258 12258 12258 12258 12258 12258
no. of parameters 16 16 16 35 35 35 284 282 283
1st stage F 5 1649 1334 2 653 517 3 691 544
Dependent Variable
Fixed Effects
Estimation Method IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Inverse Exp. Elast. 0.031 0.065 0.067
(0.006) (0.012) (0.011)
Mid and High Inv Exp Elast 5.17 10.64 10.99
(0.89) (1.37) (1.27)
Log(1/Export Elasticity) 0.97 2.04 2.11
(0.17) (0.27) (0.25)
Observations 9952 9952 9952 9952 9952 9952 9952 9952 9952
no. of parameters 13 13 13 32 32 32 227 226 227
1st stage F 129 1448 1187 48 580 456 50 611 477
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis (heteroskedasticity robust).Industry dummies defined by section according to the Harmonized Standard tariff 
schedule. 
Average Tariff at 4-digit HS (%)
Country Country & Industry Industry by Country 
Country Country & Industry Industry by Country
Panel B: Sub sample (exc. Bolivia, S. Arabia, Oman)
Table 8
Tariffs and Market Power Across Goods (within countries): IV Estimates
Panel A: Full sample
Average Tariff at 4-digit HS (%)
Dependent Variable
Fixed Effects Ind. by Country
Ind. by 
Country Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind.
Estimation Method IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV Tobit IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV Tobit IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV Tobit IV GMM
Sample All Exc. Bol., Om., Sau. China Russia Taiwan
Saudi 
Arabia Ukraine Czech Algeria Belarus Ecuador Oman Paraguay Lithuania Lebanon Bolivia Latvia Mean Median
Log(1/Export Elasticity) 1.73 2.11 7.60 2.42 1.98 1.75 0.71 0.16 5.40 2.28 1.55 0.60 2.44 0.83 2.41 0.79 1.41 2.15 1.75
(0.21) (0.25) (1.78) (0.61) (0.78) (2.55) (0.26) (0.24) (0.97) (0.52) (0.34) (0.18) (0.67) (0.27) (0.54) (0.36) (0.60)
Observations 12258 9952 1089 1021 841 1031 685 1000 739 703 753 628 510 768 754 647 868
no. of parameters 283 227 20 18 20 . 18 20 18 18 19 . 17 19 20 . 19
1st stage F 544 477 45 44 12 7.6* 48 60 60 40 45 3.7* 33 35 52 8.96* 37
Mean Tariff (%) 13.4 14.2 38.2 10.3 8.9 12.2 5.8 5.5 23.8 12.4 9.8 5.7 16.0 2.3 15.0 9.8 7.0
Elasticity (at mean) 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.14 0.12 0.03 0.23 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.08 0.20 0.17 0.16
Dependent Variable
Fixed Effects Ind. by Country
Ind. by 
Country Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind.
Estimation Method IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV Tobit IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV Tobit IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV Tobit IV GMM
Sample All Exc. Bol., Om., Sau. China Russia Taiwan
Saudi 
Arabia Ukraine Czech Algeria Belarus Ecuador Oman Paraguay Lithuania Lebanon Bolivia Latvia Mean Median
Mid and High Inv Exp Elast 9.07 10.99 35.3 11.3 11.2 7.3 3.6 0.8 28.7 12.7 8.6 2.5 19.0 3.7 16.3 5.6 6.3 12 9
(1.08) (1.27) (7.73) (2.85) (3.88) (10.84) (1.32) (1.17) (4.78) (2.90) (1.81) (0.57) (5.86) (1.19) (3.65) (2.44) (2.61)
Observations 12258 9952 1089 1021 841 1031 685 1000 739 703 753 628 510 768 754 647 868
no. of parameters 282 226 20 18 20 . 18 20 18 18 19 . 17 19 19 . 19
1st stage F 691 611 62 54 17 10.7* 64 77 84 47 56 5.2* 22 52 46 8.5* 57
Mean Tariff (%) 13.4 14.2 38.2 10.3 8.9 12.2 5.8 5.5 23.8 12.4 9.8 5.7 16.0 2.3 15.0 9.8 7.0
mid-hi/mean (%) 68 77 92 110 126 60 61 14 121 103 87 44 119 163 109 57 90 90 92
* z-stat of the instrument in the first stage of IV Tobit.
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis (heteroskedasticity robust). Industry dummies defined by section according to the Harmonized Standard tariff schedule. Extreme tariff outliers were dropped. This affects the sample of only 5 countries and even then only 
slightly since the criteria only drops 3-7% of their observations (those with tariff values more than 3 times the interquartile range above the 75th percentile or below the 25th). Bolivia, Oman and Saudi Arabia are estimated via an IV Tobit procedure to account 
for the fact that a large fraction of their observations are censored from above and/or below. Given the lack of variation in their tariff within industries their estimation does not include industry dummies. 
Average Tariff at 4-digit HS (%)
Panel B: Dummy
Table 9
Tariffs and Market Power Across Goods by country: IV Estimates







Mid and High Inv Exp Elast 9.07 9.04 10.20
(1.08) (1.24) (1.79)
Mid and High Inv Imp Elast -0.20
(2.08)
Mid and hi Inv. Imp. Pen/Imp. elast 6.28
(1.97)




Log(Inv. Imp. Pen/Imp. elas.) 1.59
(0.55)
Observations 12258 12258 12258 12258 5178 5178
no. of parameters 282 283 283 284 132 133
1st stage F (Market power) 691 544 370 312 171 129
1st stage F (other) na na 102 144 131 188
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis (heteroskedasticity robust).Industry dummies defined by section according to the Harmonized Standard 
tariff schedule. The countries with available data for the lobbying specifications are Bolivia, China, Ecuador, Latvia Lithuania, Taiwan and 
Ukraine. This data is not available for mining and agricultural products.
Industry by Country
IV GMM
Pooled (all) Pooled (all) Pooled (7)
Table 10
Market Power vs. Tariff Revenue or Lobbying as a Source of Protection
Average Tariff at 4-digit HS (%)
Market Power Market Power and         Tariff Revenue
Market Power and 
Lobbying
Dependent Variable
Fixed Effects Ind. by Country Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind.
Estimation Method IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV Tobit IV GMM
Sample Pooled (7) China Taiwan Ukraine Ecuador Lithuania Bolivia Latvia Mean Median
Log(1/Export Elasticity) 1.94 4.69 2.39 0.91 1.81 0.84 0.97 1.52 1.87 1.5
(0.38) (2.12) (1.32) (0.25) (0.45) (0.27) (0.16) (0.67)
Log(Inv. Imp. Pen/Imp. elas.) 1.59 6.21 0.43 0.97 0.27 1.64 0.21 1.89 1.66 1.0
(0.55) (4.31) (1.18) (0.75) (0.57) (0.40) (0.19) (1.33)
Observations 5178 861 780 616 712 706 618 788
no. of parameters 133 21 20 19 20 20 . 20
1st stage F: log(1/exp. El) 129 38 6 25 24 18 9 18
1st st. F: log(Imp. pen/imp. el) 188 37 32 7 47.2 28.5 18.4 24.9
Mean Tariff (%) 12.8 37.0 8.8 5.7 10.0 2.4 9.8 6.9
Elasticity (at mean) 0.15 0.13 0.27 0.16 0.18 0.35 0.10 0.22 0.20 0.18
Dependent Variable
Fixed Effects Ind. by Country Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind.
Estimation Method IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV Tobit IV GMM
Sample Pooled (7) China Taiwan Ukraine Ecuador Lithuania Bolivia Latvia Mean Median
Mid and High Inv Exp Elast 10.2 22.9 13.3 4.2 10.3 3.4 8.0 6.7 9.83 8.0
(1.79) (9.18) (4.61) (1.17) (2.87) (1.43) (0.92) (2.86)
Mid and hi Inv. Imp. Pen/Imp. elast 6.28 16.1 0.9 1.4 1.5 6.4 2.5 6.4 5.01 2.5
(1.97) (10.07) (3.52) (1.84) (3.35) (1.84) (1.36) (3.54)
Observations 5178 861 780 616 712 706 618 788
no. of parameters 132 21 20 19 20 20 . 20
1st stage F: log(1/exp. El) 171 48 10 36 27 24 9 29
1st st. F: log(Imp. pen/imp. el) 131 37 18 11 23.9 14.0 17.8 19.7
Mean Tariff (%) 12.8 37.0 8.8 5.7 10.0 2.4 9.8 6.9
Mid-hi Inv Exp Elast /mean (%) 80 62 151 73 103 140 82 97 101 97
* z-stat of the relevant instrument in first stage.
Average Tariff at 4-digit HS (%)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis (heteroskedasticity robust). Constant and industry dummies included but not reported. Industry dummies defined by section 
according to the Harmonized Standard tariff schedule. Observations with extreme outliers in terms of tariffs were dropped. This affects the sample for Taiwan, 
Lithuania and Ukraine but only slightly since the criteria drops less than 36 observations in any of these countries (those with tariff values more than 3 times the 
interquartile range above the 75th percentile or below the 25th). Bolivia is estimated via an IV Tobit procedure to account for the fact that a large fraction of their 




Market Power and Lobbying: IV Estimates by Country
Average Tariff at 4-digit HS (%)
Panel A: Semilog
Variable Measure 
Pooled           
(Table 8A)
Subsample        
(Table 8B)
Typical Country   
(Table 9)
Pooled           
(Table 10)
Typical Country   
(Table 11)
β 1.7 pp 2.1 pp 1.8 pp 1.9 pp 1.5 pp
Elasticity                     
(β /mean tariff) 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.18
β *s.d. 5 pp 6 pp 5 pp 5 pp 4 pp
Elasticity relative to PE (β /γ ) . . . 1.2 0.9
Impact relative to PE 
(β *s.d.(lnω )/γ *s.d.(lnz/σ)) . . . 1.6 1.5
β 9 pp 11 pp 9 pp 10 pp 8 pp
Mid and High Inv Exp Elast β /mean tariff (%) 68% 77% 92% 80% 97%
Impact relative to PE           
( β /γ ) . . . 1.6 3.1
Note:  β  and γ  correspond to the coefficients on market power and the lobbying variable respectively. "pp" stands for percentage points.
Log(1/Export Elasticity)
Table 12
Economic and Statistical Importance of Market Power in Tariff Setting: Summary Measures
Specification





Mid and High Inv Exp Elast 0.90 38.8 4.93 70.8
(0.31) (15.73) (1.52) (21.99)
Mid and hi Inv. Imp. Pen/Imp. elast -0.08 3.99
(0.86) (13.14)
Log(1/Export Elasticity) 0.22 9.71 1.16 16.0
(0.08) (4.00) (0.39) (5.47)
Log(Inv. Imp. Pen/Imp. elas.) 0.19 4.74
(0.34) (4.94)
Observations*** 804 804 804 804 708 708 708 708
no. of parameters 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
1st stage z-stat (Market power) 7.1 6.6 7.1 6.6 6.2 5.3 6.2 5.3





Mid and High Inv Exp Elast 21.2 1.52 26.9 1.89
(5.53) (1.18) (8.05) (1.58)
Mid and hi Inv. Imp. Pen/Imp. elast 10.8 -0.63
(4.91) (0.96)
Log(1/Export Elasticity) 5.07 0.36 5.58 0.45
(1.36) (0.28) (1.86) (0.38)
Log(Inv. Imp. Pen/Imp. elas.) 4.76 -0.18
(1.69) (0.34)
Observations*** 870 870 869 869 775 775 774 774
no. of parameters 20 20 20 20 21 21 21 21
1st stage z-stat (Market power) 7.3 7.1 7.3 7.1 6.0 5.3 6.0 5.3
1st stage z-stat (other) na na na na 10.0 11.6 10.0 11.6
Mean 30.6 30.6 3.4 3.4 33.0 33.0 3.7 3.7
Mid-hi Inv Exp Elast /mean (%) 69 45 81 51
Elasticity (at mean) 0.17 0.11 0.17 0.12
*** The difference in the number of observations across specifications is due to missing production data for mining and agricultural products. The difference between tariff 
and non-tariff barriers is due to the lack of variation of NTBs within certain industries, which must therefore be dropped. The tariff results in Panel B based on a 
comparable sample to the NTB are identical. 
Coverage Ratio (HS-4)
(1)                        (2) (3)                        (4) (5)                        (6)
Coverage Ratio (HS-4)* Advalorem equiv. (HS-4, %)
(7)                        (8)
Market Power
IV Tobit IV Tobit**
* Coverage ratio is defined as the fraction of HS-6 digit tariff lines in a given HS-4 category that had an NTB. Since it varies between zero and 1 we use a two-limit IV 
Tobit. For the remaining variables we use a lower limit Tobit that accounts for censoring at zero. There is a lower share of censored observations in Panel B, and we 
confirmed that these results are very similar if we use IV-GMM instead.
** We employ the Newey two-step estimator in the specifications with more than one endogenous variables since it is well known that in these cases the maximum 
likelihood estimator has difficulty in converging.  
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Industry dummies defined by section according to the Harmonized Standard tariff schedule. 
Non-WTO (HS-4, %) WTO  (HS-4, %) Non-WTO (HS-4, %) WTO  (HS-4, %)
Industry Industry
Advalorem equiv. (HS-4, %)
Market Power and Lobbying
(1)                        (2) (3)                        (4) (5)                        (6) (7)                        (8)
Panel B: Tariff Barriers
IV Tobit IV Tobit**
Table 13
Market Power and Lobbying as a Source of Protection in the US
Industry Industry
Market Power Market Power and Lobbying
Panel A: Non-Tariff Barriers
Appendix I: Optimal tariff with CES utility for foreign varieties
We employ a utility function u  uMD for the non-numeraire goods where M is the
subutility function for imported goods and D is a composite domestic good. This is consistent
with the empirical approach we employ to estimate the elasticities. We rule out income effects
by using the quasilinear structure outlined in the text. Moreover, we takeM as a Cobb-Douglas
aggregate over imported goods g  Gm, so M  g Mgg . EachMg is in turn composed of
varieties that are aggregated via a CES utility,Mg  vdgv1gmgvg1/g where dgv  0 is a taste
or quality parameter for gv and 1/1  g represents the constant elasticity of substitution, g.
Finally, we assume that the subutility represented by u gives rise to constant expenditure. That
is u  lnMD. Thus we can rewrite the utility as
U  c0  
gGm
g lnvdgv1gmgvg1/g   lnD ; 0  g  1
This structure implies separability across imported goods but not its varieties. We could
provide a similar treatment to the domestic composite good but since it is log separable this is
not necessary in order to determine the optimal tariffs for each imported good. As shown in the
standard model in the text a demand structure with quasilinear utility and separability over
goods g implies that tariffs in any good g only impact welfare through the consumption of that
good and the tariff revenue it generates. Thus we can focus on deriving the optimal tariff
separately for each good g  Gm. Furthermore, we assume that gv  g for all v in a given
good.
We now show that the optimal tariff for each of these goods is given by the inverse export
supply elasticity as we estimate it. In the estimation we must assume the elasticities are
constant and identical within goods across imported varieties. Therefore we impose those
conditions and write the export supply for each variety of good g as
mgv  agvpgv1/g all g,v
Note that different exporters may have different agv and this variation, along with the
differences in demand taste generate variation in prices across exporters that is important in
identifying the elasticities empirically (we also use the time variation). The demand for each
variety is obtained by minimizing expenditure subject to obtaining a given levelMg. It is given
by
mgv  dgv pgpgv gMg
 gdgvpgvgpgg1
where pg represents the standard price index, v dgvpgv 1g 1/1g. The second line uses the
fact that u has a constant expenditure share and that the maximization of that utility will yield
pgMg  g. Using this and the export supply equation we obtain the market clearing price
obtained by foreign exporters, pgv  pgv/1  gv.
gdgvpgv 1  ggpgg1  agvpgv1/g
pgv  gv1  ggpgg1
g
1gg
where gv  gdgvagv depends on variety specific characteristics.
The key insight to showing that the optimal tariff equals g is to note that the tariff does
not affect the relative demand of varieties in any given good. Therefore the only distortion that
it addresses is the terms of trade externality. T here are three assumptions that are required for
this result. First, consumption a nd export supply e lasticities within a good are c onstant. Second, 
they are identical across varieties or e xporters of that good. Third, tarif f s are e qual across e xporters
of the same good. To see this we can simply use the expressions f or m gv and pgv to obtain the








To obtain individual prices, pgv , as a function of tariffs we first solve for the aggregate price
index of each good and then replace it in the expression for pgv . To do so we first note that
pg  1  g v dgvpgv 1g 1/1g and then aggregate the individual prices from the market
clearing conditions to obtain an expression similar to this one, which can be solved to obtain
pgg  1  g 11g 




. We can verify that if g  0 there is
complete pass-through from tariffs to the aggregate price of g and as g increases the effect of
tariffs to domestic prices is attenuated. Replacing this in the market clearing condition for
each variety we obtain pgv g.





The pass-through of the tariff factor to domestic prices is simply
d lnpgv/d ln1  g  1  d lnpgv /d ln1  g  1/1  g, where the last equality follow
from differentiating the last equation. Had we explicitly included the exchange rate, its
pass-through would be exactly symmetric to the tariff factor. The elasticity of the exporter
price wrt the tariff itself is d lnpgv /d lng   g1g
g
1g .
The equilibrium imports as a function of tariffs is then mgv  mgv , for each variety of g
given by
mgv g  1  g
1
1g gv
gv  agvgvg1 11gg
The government will then choose g for each good to maximize the following social
welfare expression
maxg W  1 
g
Wg  d  sd
where for each good g we have that Wg is given by
gvpgv gmgvg  g lngvdgv1gmgvgg1/g  gvpgvgmgvg. The foc for each
good g can then be derived and simplified to obtain
v gpgv dmgvdg  mgv
dpgv
dg  0
Therefore we obtain an expression similar to the one in the text under the standard model.
However, now it is defined over the sum of the varieties. To see that the elasticity we estimate
is exactly the solution we can rewrite the expression above in terms of the elasticities of mgv
and pgv wrt g. Using the equilibrium level of imports and prices derived it is simple to see that









vpgv mgv  11  g
g




1  g 
1g  0
This implies that g  g for all g.
Appendix II: Testing the independence of errors assumption 
The estimation of elasticities relies on the independence of errors across relative demand and 
supply shocks, ( ) 0ig igk kt ivgt ivgtE ε δ = . As we describe in that section the double differencing eliminates many 
possible reasons why such shocks would be correlated. However, there is one potential case that would 
lead to such a correlation. In this section, we test whether it affects our estimates.  
New sub-varieties of a particular variety (e.g. new HS-10 products within a given HS 6-digit of 
a given exporter) may appear as a demand shock (εivgt). Moreover, in some models of trade, 
productivity shocks (which are one component of the error in the supply equation, δivgt) will cause the 
number of exported varieties to rise. If these shocks occurred in all varieties (i.e. exporters) of g the 
independence condition would still be satisfied. However, if the shocks differ across varieties it would 
not. Naturally, there are other supply shocks, which may be far more important determinants of relative 
costs in the real world. In the case of our data we think that exchange rate shocks are one source of 
large variation at the yearly frequency that we exploit. So even if the case above is a theoretical 
possibility, it is not necessarily important in the data. . This is what we now test. 
The concern can be thought of in terms of the level of aggregation. If we could observe all sub-
varieties (i.e., sub-varieties within 6-digit varieties), then there would be no problem. Our data already 
breaks up the typical countries’ imports into 30,000 varieties, so the scope for sub-varieties is likely to 
be limited because they are not likely to be that differentiated from existing ones. However, other 6-
digit goods are more differentiated. For example, sector 62160 (gloves and mittens) contains at least 
two sub-varieties: gloves and mittens. Unfortunately, we cannot observe 6-digit sub-varieties for most 
of the countries in our sample because the data is not available. However, in the case of the U.S. we do 
have more detailed HS 10-digit data that allows us to directly evaluate how large is the bias in our 
point estimates from focusing on 6-digit vs. 10-digit data. 
Our strategy for testing the validity of the error independence assumption is the following. We 
classify each U.S. 6-digit category by the role that sub-varieties play in its growth, and estimate 4-digit 
supply elasticities using only the sub-sample of 6-digit varieties in which changes in sub-varieties were 
negligible. We then compare these estimates, where we expect the identifying assumption to hold with 
the estimates obtained using all varieties. If the elasticity estimates are similar we can conclude that 
our identifying assumption also holds in the full sample. Thus we exploit the fact that we have over-
identifying conditions for each elasticity (i.e. more varieties than typically needed for the estimation) 
and use the HS-10 digit data to identify the part of the sample where the identifying assumption is 
more likely to hold.  
We measure the importance of the extensive margin for each 6-digit variety similarly to 
Feenstra (1994) and Hummels and Klenow (2005):  
(A1) 
( ) ( )1
vt
1
Measure of extensive margin  = ln lnvt v vt v
vt vt




   −      
, 
where mvt is the total imports of the U.S. of 6-digit variety v at time t, and Iv is the set of 10-digit sub-
varieties of v that were imported in both periods t and t-1. Thus, mvt(Iv) is the value in period t of all 
sub-varieties of variety v that were common across periods. In particular, this measures the absolute 
change in the share of common sub-varieties between periods t and t-1. If the change in this share is 
zero, then there was no net change in the importance of sub-varieties within the variety. The larger the 
measure, the more important the extensive margin is. 
Table A1 reports the histogram of the per-year average measure in (A1) across all varieties. In 
80 percent of the HS-6 varieties the creation or destruction of sub-varieties moved the value of its sales 
 by less than 2 percent. For around 90 percent of the varieties it is less than 9 percent. This indicates 
that for the vast majority of cases there are few changes in the importance of sub-varieties. Of course, 
the fact that movements in sub-varieties are unimportant for most varieties does not, by itself, prove 
that sub-varieties do not have an effect on our market power estimates. We therefore turn to estimating 
this impact. 
Table A2 presents regressions that compare the 4-digit inverse supply elasticities estimated 
with the full sample of 6-digit varieties and the elasticities estimated using the restricted sample of 6-
digit varieties where the extensive margin has little or no importance (and thus is less subject to the 
referee’s criticism). We employ a cut-off of 5%, that is we eliminate any HS-6 where the extensive 
margin growth was more than 5%. The results are not sensitive to the exact cut-off. 
To minimize the impact of influential outliers, we do the regression in logs. If sub-variety 
growth lead to a violation of our identifying assumption then it would generate biased estimates. This 
would imply that the elasticities based on the restricted sample would be systematically different from 
the estimates based on the full sample. 
Column 1 shows that in the OLS regression the coefficient is 0.9 and the R2 around 80 percent. 
This point estimate is likely to be attenuated because we do not adjust for measurement error in our 
independent variable. We easily confirm this is the case by running the reverse regression (i.e. placing 
the estimate that uses the restricted sample on the left-hand side) and finding the same coefficient. We 
correct for this measurement error bias in the second column by instrumenting for the log of the 
inverse export elasticity with the average log elasticity of the same 4-digit HS good obtained from a 
sample of 5 developed countries (Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom). This 
yields a point estimate of 1.0. This is strong evidence against the hypothesis that sub-variety growth is 
biasing our elasticity estimates.  
 Table A1   
 US Measure of Sub-variety per variety   
  (as defined in eq. (A1))   
 Percentile Centile   
 50 0.00   
 60 0.00   
 70 0.00   
 80 0.02   
 90 0.09   
 95 0.19   
 99 1.72   
 Number of 6-digit varieties: 112616   
     
 Table A2  
 Dependent variable : lninv (US Sample)  
 Restriction  5 percent 5 percent  
 Type OLS IV  
 lninv (Restricted Sample) 0.9 1.0  
  (0.015) (0.034)  
 Observations 1038 1015  
 R-squared 0.78   
 F 1st stage  269  
 Varieties Restricted / Full* 0.76 0.76  
Standard errors in parentheses. *Represents the number of observations used to calculate the 
elasticities in the full relative to the restricted sample. 
 
